# Process review of GoK's Economic Inclusion Programme

## Report 2: Assessment of Mentorship

Tim Conway and Anita Ntale

March 2024

# Disclaimer

# Executive Summary

## *Background and context*

**The Government of Kenya (GoK) has made significant progress in building a social protection system to protect and promote the welfare of Kenyan citizens.** The National Safety Net Programme (NSNP) creates a framework for coordinating and harmonising Kenya's four main cash transfer programmes. Building on this foundation, the Government is seeking to support economic inclusion of poor and vulnerable households, so that they can improve their livelihoods and incomes and so work their way out of poverty on a permanent basis.

**To support this objective, the World Bank and the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) are supporting a package of related measures under the Kenya Social and Economic Inclusion Programme (KSEIP).** KSEIP is supporting (i) the shock responsiveness of the social protection system, by strengthening the capacity of the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP); (ii) the integration and effectiveness of common social protection delivery systems (focussing on the coverage and functioning of the Single Registry); and (iii) trialling 'cash plus' programmes which extend a basic safety net with linkages to child nutrition services (the Nutrition Improvement through Cash and Health Education programme, or NICHE) or supporting poor households to develop alternative livelihoods which provide a sustainable path out of poverty (the Economic Inclusion Programme, or EIP).

**The pilot EIP aims to provide a sequenced, time-bound set of interventions targeted to poor households.** This follows a 'poverty graduation' model of sequenced interventions. Regular cash transfers for 12 months help smooth household consumption; EIP mentors help participants to identify viable livelihood options, provide them with the skills to set up and run a viable business, and help them organise Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) to expand their access to credit; and an asset transfer (in the form of two large cash payments, one of KSh 20,000 and a second, six months later, of KSh 10,000) provides seed capital for the business.

**The design of the EIP lays out a sequence of phases to enable the Government to develop the capacity to implement the programme.** The first phase of EIP (sometimes referred to as 'cohort 1') has been delivered by a consortium of NGOs working under contract to the Directorate of Social Development (DSD). Under the leadership of Global Development Incubator (GDI), two NGOs with extensive experience in Kenya (BOMA and Village Enterprise) have been contracted to (i) develop and implement a simplified variant of economic inclusion programming which can eventually be implemented by the Government at scale and (ii) help build GoK capacity to assume responsibility for direct implementation of the EIP in later phases.

**Phase 1 was to cover 7,500 households located in 10 sub-counties of five counties in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) in the north of Kenya.** During this first phase, which began with targeting in July 2021, GoK counterparts were to observe, engage and learn how to implement. The GDI-led consortium was tasked with implementing the EIP with an eye to handover, building GoK capacity so that the second phase could be implemented by Government, with the GDI-led consortium reducing their role to provide backstopping and support as needed.

## *The KSEIP monitoring, evaluation and knowledge (MEK) component*

**Oxford Policy Management (OPM) has been contracted to provide technical assistance to the MEK component of KSEIP.** This package includes two workstreams relating to the EIP. The first is a mixed-methods impact evaluation of the EIP, which will identify whether the programme

has improved final outcomes for participants, and if so, by how much. The second workstream provides two process reviews of core elements of EIP implementation. These are primarily qualitative assessments of "the effectiveness and efficiency of the economic inclusion implementation process, with a focus on operational lessons and recommendations for scale-up". The first process review assessed what did and did not work in targeting, examining the approach to and outcomes of EIP processes for identifying, selecting and enrolling participants (OPM 2023).

**This second process review report examines the implementation of mentoring**. Mentoring is seen as central to the success of economic inclusion programming. Mentors provide sustained support to programme participants, both in terms of the knowledge and skills needed to establish a viable business, and broader support to build confidence and aspirations. Within the EIP, they have also been central to targeting and enrolment and monitoring programme implementation.

**Two different models of the EIP were implemented: Model A, implemented by BOMA, and Model B, implemented by Village Enterprises.** With regard to mentoring, these differed in terms of the size of the Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLA) that the mentors established and supported, and the point at which these VSLAs were established; and the duration of contact between mentors and participants. The two models also differed in respects other than mentoring activity (most importantly, in the earlier approach to targeting, the timing of asset transfers, and the manner in which mentors were involved in collecting information on programme implementation).

**These variations reflected differences in the practices employed by BOMA and Village Enterprise in economic inclusion programmes they had trialled before the EIP**; which in turn reflected differences (in poverty levels, population density, and markets) between the geographical footprints of the two models. However, many fundamental aspects of design were common to both.

**This report aims to answer research questions specifically related to the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the mentoring approach designed and implemented during phase 1.** As such, it examines how the programme has recruited and trained a cadre of just under 150 mentors; how these mentors were subsequently deployed and managed to provide participants with livelihood skills, advice, and assistance in forming business groups and VSLAs; and the degree to which implementation has engaged Government staff and built GoK capacity to assume greater leadership of EIP management during phase 2 and beyond. The report examines progress achieved and challenges encountered over the period from the start of EIP phase 1 and recruitment of mentors and mentor supervisors (early 2021) through to the reflection workshop held with stakeholders in Nairobi in June 2023.

**Primary research for this review is based on qualitative data collected from participants and programme stakeholders; combined with secondary analysis of monitoring data supplied by the programme.** Key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with implementors; GoK staff; development partners; and participants. As well as interviewing staff in leadership roles at the central level in Nairobi, the review has spoken with BOMA, Village Enterprise and GoK field staff – mentors, mentor supervisors, Country Programme Managers, GoK Country Coordinators and Sub-County Social Development Officers (SCSDOs) - in a sample of counties and sub-counties. These accounts were supplemented by review of programme documents and monitoring datasets supplied by GDI in April 2023. A first draft of this review provided the basis for a validation workshop held in Nairobi on the 6th and 7th June 2023. Discussions in that workshop have been used to revise the review.

## Key findings

### Mentoring was relevant to the context and delivered in appropriate formats.

**Implementation of mentoring activity followed design in many important respects.** The programme succeeded in recruiting very close to the target numbers of mentors (150) and mentor supervisors (10) to serve a target of 7,500 participants. The recruitment, training and onboarding programme for mentors, the process followed to facilitate the formation of business groups and VSLAs, the provision of ongoing advice and support through monthly visits, and the recording and reporting of implementation activity and participant status were all in line with the design as laid out in the Operational Manual.

**The design of the mentoring component was sound, reflecting lessons and evidence from both Kenyan and international experience.** Participants reported that the training imparted useful knowledge and skills which helped them to identify business opportunities and run their enterprises more effectively than they had in the past. There were mixed views on the EIP's preference for delivering mentoring to groups of participants rather than individual participants. (Preference for individual businesses may have reflected in part the difficulties with other parts of the programming - namely, delays faced by some participants in receiving their asset transfers - which complicated group formation.) The EIP model of VSLA formation and management was seen to provide a discipline that had not been achieved with earlier self-guided efforts at rotating savings and loans.

**The contribution of the mentoring component is notable given that for many participants it was the primary benefit that they received from the EIP.** Many participants experienced severe delays in receiving the financial support the programme was intended to provide (both regular consumption support payments and asset transfers). As such, the skills and guidance provided by mentors was for many the main benefit they received for most of the duration of phase 1.

### Coherence with GoK systems is difficult to achieve, given the lack of existing mentoring practice in Government.

**Phase 1 of the EIP was meant to seek coherence with GoK systems and programmes.** It was hoped that by aligning with existing public sector practice wherever possible, rather than introducing alternative EIP-specific approaches, phase 1 would develop implementation arrangements which could be more easily incorporated into Government and later scaled up.

**However, *direct* coherence with existing arrangements is not possible for aspects of the EIP which are not already present in Government.** Compared to the previous review of EIP targeting, discussion of how EIP mentoring is or is not coherent with Government systems is thus qualitatively different. The Government has well-established systems for targeting cash transfer programmes. With adaptations, the EIP could reasonably be expected to align its own targeting with these systems, and so achieve coherence. By contrast, mentoring for economic inclusion is a novel approach for the Kenyan Government: there is no direct equivalent to EIP mentoring in existing GoK practice, which limits the extent to which it is possible to achieve coherence in phase 1 mentoring systems.

Coherence can be assessed at a more general level, in terms of how mentoring, if adopted by Government, might fit with underlying GoK processes for public administration.

*Considerable effort is needed to build capacity before GoK can implement mentoring.*

**If as originally planned mentors were to be moved from NGO to GoK employment in phase 2, this would represent a very large increase in local government payrolls.** In phase 1, BOMA and Village Enterprise have been employing 15 mentors and one mentor supervisor in each sub-county. There are no direct equivalents to these posts in local government at present. The local government position that most closely resembles an EIP role is that of the Sub-County Social Development Officer, of which there is one (and sometimes two) per sub-county. The deputy SCSDO role could be adapted so that the post-holder performs the function of EIP mentor supervisor.

**However, if the Government is to employ mentors directly (rather than contracting in NGOs), and reproduce the staffing levels of phase 1, it will still need to create 15 new posts for mentors in each sub-county in which the EIP operated.** It is possible to find a basic level of coherence between the salary and benefit packages that Government-employed mentors would receive and what they have received during phase 1: but recruiting and training some 100-150 staff on these terms would require a major increase in the recurrent budget of the sub-counties. As stakeholders noted in mid-2023, recruitment would also take considerable time; and would necessitate strengthening supporting systems for human resource and budget management at county and sub-county levels.

**Capacity is also needed at the central level, in terms of programme management systems and the Nairobi-based staff required to administer them.** There is a small but qualified technical team in the DSD in Nairobi: while this does not directly mirror the programme management team in the GDI-led consortium, it does provide the basis for future DSD oversight of programme implementation. There is a need however to strengthen the leadership of the programme: the head of the EIP unit has changed twice over the course of Phase 1.

*GoK engagement in mentoring has been limited; frontline capacity is still very limited.*

**Planning these changes demands sustained close engagement between the GDI-led implementing consortium and the Government. This engagement appears not to have occurred to a significant degree during phase 1.** While engagement has varied between locations and over time, it has tended to be high at the start (during targeting and training) and then drop off. Government staff at all levels are often over-stretched. This has limited their ability both to observe and participate in programme activities in phase 1 (which has limited the extent to which it has been possible to build capacity through 'learning by doing'); and their ability to work with the management of GDI, BOMA and Village Enterprise to discuss and agree on the model of EIP delivery – including mentoring – that should be used in phase 2.

**During phase 1, coordination between programme stakeholders has been problematic.** Difficulties have arisen not only from weak engagement of local government staff in the NGO-led delivery of mentoring activities, but also from weak coordination between the Directorate for Social Development (DSD), which is meant to assume responsibility for EIP implementation, including the work of the mentors; and the Directorate for Social Assistance (DSA), which is responsible for the delivery of cash transfers (including EIP consumption support and asset transfers) and case management.

**Turnover in GoK staffing is a significant problem and acts as a brake on the accumulation of GoK capacity.** The NGOs implementing phase 1 noted the large number of key GoK posts, at DSD, county and sub-county levels, which had seen change in staffing since the start of the programme. The small core team of technical specialists in the EIP unit of DSD in Nairobi has, fortunately, remained constant: however, the leadership of both the DSD and the Directorate for

Social Assistance (DSA – which is also responsible for key functions in implementing the EIP) have changed over the course of the pilot. This has impeded the evolution of GoK ownership of the EIP and capacity to implement it.

*Mentoring has been effective in improving participants' opportunities, even in the absence of the complementary components of EIP intervention.*

**The mentoring component appears to have delivered the intended scope and reach of activities.** Just under the target number of mentors (149) were working as of April 2023. Across the programme as a whole, the majority were women, although this was not the case in sub-counties in which the EIP was implemented by Model A. Training has been delivered to participants (albeit on a schedule which has been adapted to delays in enrolment and payments); and the target number of VSLAs has been established. Interviews and FGDs with participants and county/subcounty DSD staff suggest that mentors are perceived to have performed well.

**Even in isolation from other elements of the programme, mentoring – the ongoing provision of advice and support to participants – has value in stimulating participants' aspirations and confidence, resulting in behaviour change.** Mentors have encouraged participants to look at what others are doing, understand that it is something that they could achieve, and think through what they need to do to succeed. Respondents cited the examples of participants who had received training and support to develop a business plan but not yet the asset transfer: some of these participants have made a start on a new business despite the lack of new capital, with (modest) positive results.

*Mentoring activities have been completed as planned; a few design changes could significantly reduce costs with only minor offsetting impact on benefits.*

**Despite delays due to targeting and disruption due to staggered disbursement of payments, mentoring activities were delivered within the anticipated timeframe.** Mentors identified ways in which they could improve the efficiency of their work in future phases: these would include linking participants to local government technical specialists (agricultural or livestock extension agents) and / or larger local business who might buy the products of EIP household enterprises, perhaps through more formalised contractual arrangements which would improve access to inputs and ensure a given volume of sales at a pre-arranged price.

**Both the GDI-led consortium and the DSD agreed that it should be possible to improve efficiency by reducing the mentoring 'dosage' without significant reduction in effectiveness**. Most easily, this could be achieved by shortening the period of contact between participants and mentors to 12–15 months (compared to the 18-24 months in phase 1). It could also be achieved by increasing the average number of participants that each mentor could serve, providing that (i) business groups were each formed of three households, rather than single households, (ii) mentors are employed in the localities in which they live, and not rotated to other locations over time and (iii) the ratio is kept lower in locations which are sparsely populated and where mentors must spend considerable time travelling between participants.

*To sustain the programme will require retaining NGO delivery for the next phase.*

**The design of the EIP anticipated that in phase 2 the Government would assume a much greater role in implementing the programme. This is not currently feasible.** The Government does not yet have the capacity to implement the EIP itself, with the lack of a frontline workforce of mentors and mentor supervisors perhaps the key constraint. To deliver phase 2 from late 2023 will require extending the contracting-out model so that the GDI-led consortium can continue to implement the programme for a second cohort of 7,500 participants.

**If the EIP is to continue beyond phase 2 (and, ideally, scaled up), it is essential that all parties make good use of phase 2.**  Both parties need to agree on the desired final destination of the policy process, in terms of a model of mentoring that will be effective *and* can feasibly be implemented through GoK systems with GoK budgets and staffing; and then agree on how to get there.  This requires sustained close engagement between DSD and the GDI-led consortium.

*Recommendations*

**The following recommendations emerge from the findings from the findings of the report and discussions at the validation workshop in Nairobi.**  These recommendations focus on the actions that are needed in transitioning from the phase 1 pilot to phase 2, in anticipation of moving to GoK implementation from phase 3.  Arrangements for phase 2 will need to balance (i) realism regarding current capacity and what is needed to ensure continued delivery of the programme over the course of 2024 with (ii) a greater level of ambition and sustained attention to building GoK capacity so that there is progress towards greater Government ownership of implementation from 2025 and beyond.

1. **In phase 2, and later phase 3, the mentoring model will need to be simpler and lighter than it has been to date.**  A shorter duration of mentor contact with participants, higher ratios of participants to mentors and more rigorous adherence to the group-based model of EIP business creation should all help reduce costs with limited impact of impact.  DSD and GDI should build linkages to draw in Government technical specialists (e.g. extension agents) and local private sector actors to comments EIP businesses to knowledge, skills, inputs and markets.

2. **The key concern for DSD now is building GoK capacity to deliver mentorship directly, rather than through contracting NGOs.**  There is an urgent need for some critical decisions and actions to ensure that the contract with the GDI-led consortium is extended and mentor and mentor supervisor functions are adequately staffed in Phase  2. Agreement on this issue is necessary before planning can begin for Phase  2.

3. **By the end of Phase 2, the Government will need to have decided whether to implement the EIP directly as per the original plan; and if so, how.**  For the Government to employ mentors and mentor supervisors will require negotiations with Treasury to secure recurrent budget for the payroll and related costs that this will entail.  These discussions will take time and political leadership, and need to begin as soon as possible.

4. **There may be a case for an interim hybrid arrangement.** In this approach, the posts of mentor supervisors are transitioned to GoK public sector contracts; these mentor supervisors supervise the work of mentors who are still contracted in from NGOs but are now reporting to Government supervisors, who in turn report to the EIP unit in Nairobi.

5. **It will be important to protect the capacity that *does* exist in Government.**  Government should 'ringfence' the staff who now understand the EIP (at all levels), and those who come to understand it through the start-up of Phase  2 over coming months, so that they do not get moved to other posts, resulting in a loss of capacity.

6. **Preparing for a transition to GoK implementation requires close collaboration between the GDI-led consortium and the GoK (most notably DSD).**  Both parties need to agree on the desired final destination of the policy process, in terms of a model of mentoring that will be effective *and* can feasibly be implemented through GoK systems with GoK budgets and staffing; and then agree on time-bound milestones for how to get there.  This requires sustained close engagement between DSD and the GDI-led consortium.

# Table of Contents

# List of abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| BG | business group |
| CBMA | Community-based market assessment |
| CCTP-MIS | Consolidated Cash Transfer Programmes – Management Information System |
| CDMIS | Community Development Management Information System |
| CPM | County Programme Manager |
| DSA | Directorate for Social Assistance |
| DSD | Directorate for Social Development |
| EIP | Economic Inclusion Programme |
| EQUALS | (UK FCDO) Evaluation Quality Assurance and Learning Service |
| ESR | Enhanced Single Registry |
| FCDO | (UK) Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussions |
| GDI | Global Development Incubator |
| GoK | Government of Kenya |
| KII | Key Informant Interview |
| KSEIP | Kenya Social and Economic Inclusion Programme (of the World Bank) |
| KSh | Kenyan Schilling |
| M&E | monitoring and evaluation |
| MEK | Monitoring, Evaluation and Knowledge |
| MIS | management information system |
| NGO | non-governmental organisation |
| NSNP | National Safety Net Programme |
| OECD-DAC | Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| OPM | Oxford Policy Management |
| REAP | (BOMA's) Rural Entrepreneur Access Programme |
| RGA | Research Guide Africa |
| SCSDO | Sub-County Social Development Officer |
| VE | Village Enterprise |
| VSLA | Village Savings and Loan Association |

# 1    Introduction

## 1.1    The evolution of social protection in Kenya

**Over the last two decades, the Government of Kenya has made significant progress in strengthening its national safety net programme (NSNP).** The NSNP seeks to improve the welfare and resilience of poor and vulnerable households by creating a framework for the coordination and harmonisation of Kenya's four main cash transfer programmes: the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC); the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT); the Persons with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer (PWSD-CT); and the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP).

**Building on this, GoK is committed to developing an integrated social protection system**, moving beyond cash transfers and towards enhancing the social and economic inclusion of poor and vulnerable households and individuals.

## 1.2    The Kenya Economic and Social Inclusion Programme (KSEIP)

**To support the evolution of Kenya's social protection sector, the Government of Kenya has designed KSEIP**, with support from the World Bank and the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office ( FCDO).  This package of support comprises the following three components:

- Strengthening social protection delivery systems: This component aims to enhance the coverage and functionality of the Single Registry, as well as continuing to improve the efficiency of other delivery mechanisms.

- Increasing access to social and economic inclusion interventions: This component has two sub-components: (i) the Nutrition Improvement through Cash and Health Education (NICHE) programme; and (ii) a pilot Economic Inclusion Programme (EIP) which tests the potential for the Government to implement a poverty graduation approach which will complement regular cash transfers in order to foster the human capital and livelihoods of extremely poor households.

- Improving the shock responsiveness of the safety net system: The last component aims to expand the coverage of the safety net system and to strengthen financing arrangements for providing timely support to cope with recurrent climate-induced droughts. This also includes support to building the capacity within GoK to fully take over the management, leadership, and coordination functions required to deliver HSNP (World Bank 2018).

### 1.2.1   The Economic Inclusion Programme (EIP)

**Economic inclusion programmes have been implemented by NGOs in Kenya for more than 10 years and have shown promising results in terms of poverty reduction** (World Bank 2018; BOMA 2019; Gallardo et al 2021; GDI 2021; Gobin and Santos 2021)**.** To move towards scaling up economic inclusion approaches, KSEIP is supporting a pilot programme – the EIP - to be implemented by the Department of Social Development (DSD) of the Ministry of Public Service, Gender, Senior Citizen Affairs and Special Programmes (MoPS).  Technical assistance is provided

by an NGO consortium led by the Global Development Incubator (GDI) with delivery by BOMA and Village Enterprise.

**The design of the EIP pilot is grounded in a poverty graduation approach**, along the lines originally tested at scale by BRAC in Bangladesh and since adapted in many other countries**.** This focuses on fostering the economic inclusion of extremely poor households by delivering a sequenced, time-bound, and targeted set of interventions to selected households and participants. These interventions comprise regular consumption support, skills training, asset transfer/seed capital, facilitating of savings groups, and mentoring.

**During phase 1, the GDI-led consortium has been tasked with adapting their economic inclusion approaches so that they can be implemented by the GoK, through the GoK's systems.** Two separate models of the EIP have been piloted, in different sub-counties. Model A is being implemented with support from BOMA, while Model B is being implemented with support from Village Enterprise. Although the key components of the programme are largely the same across the two models, the two differ in terms of duration (24 months for Model A and 18 months for Model B), their targeting approach, and the timing of asset transfers and Village Savings and Loans Association (VSLA) formation.

**Over the course of the pilot, the GDI-led consortium is also mandated to build the capacity of GoK staff – at national, county and sub-county levels – to deliver the EIP.** The goal of the capacity-building component is to equip the GoK (with backend support from the consortium) with the necessary skills and knowledge to independently carry out the EIP for future phases within the same counties, with the view for GoK to take the lead in scaling up the EIP to additional counties across Kenya.

**The capacity-building component includes a combination of on-the-job training and facilitated workshops or learning forums.** On-the-job training involves activities such as field visits, involving officials in the implementation process, appointing shadow officers and programme managers, and other methods that transfer technical expertise related to implementation to relevant officials within the DSD and county level. Facilitated workshops and learning forums focus on specific topics relevant to the EIP, such as targeting, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) workshops and other mentorship activities.  The GDI consortium has established three key principles that guide the capacity-building efforts within the EIP implementation (GDI, 2021):

- **Collaborative design and implementation of the EIP**: The consortium and the GoK work together in designing and implementing the EIP, ensuring joint ownership and a shared vision.

- **Learning-by-doing approach**: Through practical experience, the consortium and the GoK identify the most appropriate economic inclusion model to scale up, continuously learning and adapting along the way.

- **Focus on the extreme poor**: Both parties collaborate to develop suitable targeting methodologies and tools that effectively enrol the extreme poor into the EIP, addressing their specific needs.

## 1.2.2  The KSEIP monitoring, evaluation and knowledge component

**The overarching KSEIP programme within which EIP sits also incorporates  component is providing technical assistance to the implementation of KSEIP and Phase 3 of FCDO's support to HSNP.**  Contracted to OPM, the MEK component addresses five objectives, three of

which (objectives 1 through 3) relate to the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP), and two of which (objectives 4 and 5) relate to the EIP.

| Box 1: Objectives of the KSEIP Monitoring, Evaluation and Knowledge component |
|---|
| The MEK component aims to provide stakeholders with policy-relevant evidence and advice on:<br>1. the quality of HSNP programme delivery throughout the transition of the programme's implementation to GoK;<br>2. the capacity needs of GoK as regards managing HSNP and to inform capacity building and transition plans and processes;<br>3. the progress made in building capacity within GoK to successfully manage and finance the HSNP;<br>4. the effectiveness and efficiency of the economic inclusion implementation process, with a focus on operational lessons and recommendations for scale-up; and<br>5. the impact of economic inclusion interventions on households' poverty and wellbeing. |

To achieve these objectives, the MEK component is being implemented through four distinct workstreams, the first two of which relate to the HSNP, while the remaining two relate to the EIP:

- **Workstream 1 – Monitoring:** This workstream: (i) monitors the service delivery quality of HSNP during the process of transition and once implementation is fully transferred to GoK; and (ii) examines the effectiveness with which monitoring and reporting is managed in the existing counties, and rolled out to the additional four counties, as well as documenting how this is implemented during the transition period.

- **Workstream 2 – Capacity assessment:** In 2021, this workstream assessed the capacity of NDMA to deliver HSNP and advised on what the identified capacity issues mean for the transition to full GoK management, including the implications for capacity building. It is also providing ongoing monitoring of the capacity building and transition process.

- **Workstream 3 – Process review:** The process review focuses on the economic inclusion sub-component of KSEIP to provide insights into what has worked (or not) in terms of selected core implementation processes during the pilot phase of the implementation of the EIP. It also assesses the extent to which the programme design and implementation is compatible with GoK systems and explores whether the GoK has the required capacity to deliver the programme and its implementation processes at scale.

- **Workstream 4 – Impact evaluation:** This workstream also relates to the economic inclusion sub-component of KSEIP, and involves conducting an impact evaluation to determine whether and to what extent the EIP had a positive effect on their target population in the counties covered by the pilot programme. Further, the impact evaluation aims to assess to what extent the design of the EIP is relevant given the context and the needs of its target population and to what extent the programme's impact is sustained over time.

**Together, Workstreams 3 and 4 constitute the evaluation of the economic inclusion component of KSEIP.** While the two workstreams deliver separate outputs, one of which is this report, they should be regarded as complementary workstreams that together address evaluation questions across the whole range of the OECD-DAC criteria. The process review aims to answer questions related to the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of selected EIP implementation processes, while the impact evaluation predominantly aims to address evaluation questions related to relevance, impact, and sustainability. The evaluation

questions addressed by the process review can also be found in the process review design note, which is Addendum 5 to the inception report of the MEK component (OPM, 2021a).

**The MEK component adopts a standardized approach to evaluation governance and management,** as outlined in its inception report to ensure the proper and ethical conduct of evaluations within the MEK component (OPM, 2021b). The MEK component's framework for communications and stakeholder engagement can also be found in its inception report.

### 1.2.3 Social and economic context for the evaluation

**The EIP is implemented in five counties in Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL).** The ASALs extend across northern and eastern Kenya, are sparsely populated (accounting for 84% of Kenya's land area, but only 38% of its population) and classified as dryland agro-ecological systems[1]. Livelihoods focussing on pastoralism and smallholder agriculture are highly vulnerable to droughts, the frequency and intensity of which are increasing with climate change. Rates of poverty and food insecurity are notably higher than the national average; human development outcomes are considerably lower. In 2022, rates of childhood stunting in the ASAL counties of West Pokot, Samburu and Kitui were all above 30%, compared to the all-Kenya average of 18% (KNBS, MoH and ICF 2023 pp. 339-340). While there is considerable economic potential in the ASAL, this remains constrained by climatic variability and shocks (the ASAL contribute only 12% to the country's GDP: World Bank 2018 pp. 1-2). The 2022 baseline survey that supports the mixed-methods impact evaluation of the EIP (i.e., workstream 4 of the KSEIP MEK component) found over 85% of households in Marsabit, Kisumu, Mwatate and Taveta to be poor (Arif et al 2022)[2].

---

[1] Website of the State Department for the ASALs and Regional Development: www.asal.go.ke accessed 10th January 2024; KNBS (2019).

[2] Shafique Arif, Michele Binci, Jana Bischler, Stephanie Brockerhoff, Adiba Khaled, Marta Marzi, Juliet Odindo, Udayan Rathore and Kritika Singh (2022) *Impact Evaluation of the Economic Inclusion Programme (EIP): Baseline Report – Volume 1.* OPM; GEFA Evaluation of HSNP Phase 3.

# 2    Process review approach and methodology

## 2.1    Objective of the process review

**Through a number of distinct reports, the process review (workstream 3 of the MEK component) seeks to provide evidence to support learning lessons on critical aspects of EIP design and implementation.**   It is hoped that these lessons from phase one of the implementation of the EIP will support the Government in taking over and scaling up economic inclusion programming.  The design of the EIP anticipates that the GDI-led consortium would be the technical implementing partner for the phase 1 pilot, during which the capacity of the Government would be built.  From late 2023, DSD should lead the implementation of the second phase pilot of the EIP (with the GDI-led consortium remaining in an advisory and back-stopping role) and later lead on scaling up the programme across all of Kenya, should it be shown to be successful.

**The process review aims to provide timely insights into what has and has not worked in selected core implementation processes.** It assesses the extent to which programme design and implementation during phase 1 has been compatible with GoK systems and structures; explores whether the GoK has the required capacity[3] and tools to deliver the programme; and makes recommendations on how the Government could implement in phase 2.

## 2.2    Research focus

**It was recognised that the potential scope of the process review could be extremely broad.** During inception, OPM discussed with GoK and its partners to identify the most useful approach to this evaluation task.  It was agreed that it would add the most value by providing practical in-depth insights into a small number of key aspects of EIP, rather than spreading resources too thinly. The choice of which aspects to evaluate was also guided by the need to avoid duplication of data collection efforts of the DSD/GDI team and the time constraints of all parties involved.

**Given these parameters, it was agreed that the process review would focus on two core processes**: the first being the selection of participants for enrolment in the programme (targeting) and the second being the provision of training, advice and support to participants (mentorship). These two aspects were chosen because they are (1) of crucial importance to the delivery of the programme, and (2) new to the GoK and therefore likely to provide the greatest opportunity for learning during the pilot phase.  The case for this approach and supporting elaboration of approach, methods and workplan were outlined in October 2021 in a Design Note included as an addendum to the inception report (OPM 2021a).

**The process review addresses how these two core processes have been implemented in relation to their design.**  It identifies whether the programme has had to adapt its design or implementation, and if so, why and how it has adapted.  For both targeting and mentoring to be successfully delivered by the Government, capacity will need to be built within the GoK and systems employed to date by the implementing NGOs will need to be adapted to match existing Government systems and capacities. This perspective, focussing on the realism of implementation arrangements, will be the lens the process review will use for its analysis.

---

[3]    This is undertaken and answered based on perception data collected as part of the process review. A full capacity assessment is outside the scope of the review

## 2.2.1  Targeting

**The first process review report, on targeting, was researched in late 2022 (OPM 2023).**  The decision to focus on targeting reflected two factors:

- the two variants of the EIP pilot – Model A, implemented by BOMA, and Model B, implemented by Village Enterprise - were implementing approaches to targeting that differed from each other, and from normal GoK targeting methods.  Given that both Models' targeting approaches were new to the DSD, there was benefit to reviewing the costs and benefits of these alternatives, benchmarking these approaches against (evolving) core GoK targeting systems, and identifying what adaptations (to core GoK targeting systems and / or those used in the phase 1 EIP pilot) might be needed in later phases of the EIP.

- the success of economic inclusion programmes often depends on whether the 'right' households (poor, but with the capacity to engage in new income-generating livelihood activities) are selected for participation. While the Government has experience and well-developed systems for targeting on the basis of need (i.e., poverty), it has limited experience in targeting the intersection of need and capacity.

## 2.2.2  Mentoring

**The second core process identified as a focus for the process review - and the subject of this report - was the delivery of mentorship to participants of the EIP.** This was identified as a priority because:

- Mentorship was identified by GDI as the key success factor of the economic inclusion model. According to the underlying EIP theory of change, a sustainable improvement in the incomes and welfare of poor and vulnerable households requires a combination of improvements in both financial and human capital.  In this understanding, the consumption support and asset transfer will not have the required impact if the mentorship component fails to provide EIP participants with the skills, advice and support they need to identify and pursue new livelihoods.

- As with targeting, the first phase of the EIP pilot is implementing two different approaches to mentorship under Model A and Model B, on the grounds that the contexts in which the two models operate differ and call for slightly different approaches.  A process review of these two variant approaches to mentoring offers opportunities to identify strengths and limitations of the two models in relation to these different environments.

- Finally, the Government has no prior experience with a programmatic approach to mentorship for economic inclusion.  It is thus important to examine it in some depth in order to make explicit what did and did not work during the phase 1 pilot, and why; and identify the adjustments to GoK systems and capacities that will be necessary if the Government is to assume responsibility for implementing mentoring activities.

**The EIP Operational Manual is a key reference point for much of this review.**  It provides a definition of the role of mentors, lays out some of the assumptions about what is required for successful mentoring, specifies the qualities that are required in a mentor, and describes the process to be followed to recruit, train and manage mentors.  Mentorship is defined as

"the use of Mentors to offer consultation, advice, counselling, confidence building and life skills training;…Mentorship is the process of providing targeted support to the programme participants across the entire life cycle of the programme…delivered sequentially based on the project cycle stage and the needs of the participants to establish and run sustainable

livelihoods.  It is a structured one-on-one on-site guidance offered to participant households with the aim of increasing knowledge and building necessary skill sets" (GOK 2021 pp. 13, 15)

**The Operational Manual lays out the intended scope and organisation of the mentor workforce.**  Mentors are to be residents of the EIP target communities,     with each mentor assigned to support a maximum of 75 participants per village or village cluster. (In practice, the programme has aimed to have each mentor support only 50 participants in phase 1.)  Box 2 reproduces the programme's definition of the key roles and responsibilities of mentors.

| Box 2: **Key roles and responsibilities for EIP mentors** |
| :--- |
| • Facilitate formation of business groups - organize the business group members and help them allocate roles and responsibilities |
| • Guide the business groups to choose their business and come up with a business plan andbudget. |
| • Provide business skills training in readiness for asset/seed capital disbursement |
| • Makes monthly visits to each of the business groups to ensure that they are working welltogether and keeping financial records and sign the back of their business record books recording the visit in Mentor's own record book. |
| • Organize business groups into savings groups and attend the savings group meeting and help the savings group to design their constitution and elect group leaders/officials |
| • Conduct trainings on various topics (goal setting, family planning, managing business and savings groups money, record keeping for savings groups, managing group dynamics and leadership, business skills review and communication, borrowing and lending, investing, assessing credit worthiness). One topic is covered per week. |
| • Guides the savings groups with the loan application process once savings groups begin to lend appending signatures on all loan documentation upon review of the loan record |
| • Guide the business groups to link to markets and buyers for more profit |
| • Prepare the groups for exit ensuring that all the savings groups under EIP are assisted toregister with The Directorate of Social Development.          *EIP Revised Operations Manual (March 2023) p. 16.* |

**The designs of the two models have differed somewhat in the roles they assign to mentors.** These differences reflect the practices that the two NGOs employed in their pre-EIP inclusion programmes, which in turn reflected the differences in agro-ecological and socio-economic contexts in which they had been working.  (BOMA's REAP programme was implemented in and adapted to particularly poor and vulnerable, sparsely populated areas of northern Kenya.)

• *The duration of mentoring support.*  The design of Model A provides for mentors to provide 24 months of support to participants; Model B provides only 18 months of contact with mentors.

• *The timing of VSLA formation.*  In Model A, BOMA aimed to form VSLAs six to seven months after the first asset transfer – which in Model A was meant to occur in the first month.  In Model B, Village Enterprise aimed to form VSLAs two to four months after the first asset transfer, which was meant to occur in month three.  In design, therefore, VSLAs were to be formed somewhat earlier in Model B than Model A.

• *Size of the VSLAs.*  Model A aimed for somewhat smaller groups (12-24 members per VSLA) than Model B (25-30 members).

• *The frequency and modality of contact between mentors and participants.*  Mentors visited the field on a daily basis in Model A and twice a week in Model B. In Model A mentors have been provided with motorbikes and a fuel allowance to help them cover the considerable distances,

especially in Marsabit[4]; whereas Model B has used a transport matrix to compute the travel allowances that mentors will receive each week.

- *The degree to which mentors are involved in monitoring.* Under Model A, mentors are responsible for recording a considerable volume of data on activities and results (e.g. business performance) on an ongoing basis; under Model B, mentors collect more limited data, which is then complemented by more detailed data collected by enumerators on a quarterly basis.

The figure below summarises some of these differences in Gannt chart format.

**Figure 1: Timelines for Model A and Model B implementation**



## 2.3    EIP theory of change

**A programme theory of change (ToC) for the EIP was elaborated by OPM as part of revisions to the KSEIP MEK inception report** (OPM 2021c), to ensure that the impact evaluation and process review would comply with the EQUALS requirements for evaluation quality assurance. At this point, the GDI-led consortium had only recently been awarded the contract for providing technical assistance to the EIP pilot and was focussed on developing operational systems. OPM developed the ToC for these evaluation purposes in consultation with GDI, and in reference to international experience of economic inclusion programmes (see Annex A).

**GDI subsequently presented a similar theory of change in the EIP Monitoring and Evaluation Framework** (GoK 2021), which is included for reference as Annex B. Both the OPM / EQUALS ToC and the later GDI ToC note that the EIP pilot is expected to achieve objectives at two levels. Using the language of the GDI document, these are:

- Component 1 (implementation of the EIP pilot): to improve the socio-economic status of 7,500 extreme poor in five counties.

---

4    In North Horr sub-county, the distances are so great that two mentor supervisors are being used in place of one.

- Component 2 (design, systems and capacity building): to build systems for EIP implementation and scale-up, and improve the capacity of DSD officials to co-implement the programme in the five pilot counties and later scale up EIP beyond these counties.

**However, the OPM / EQUALS ToC provides a more detailed elaboration of the assumptions underpinning the individual causal linkages**; and so will be used in this report to answer the evaluation questions (particularly those related to relevance).

## 2.4     Key research questions

**Table 1 summarises the key research questions in line with the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria.**  These questions have informed the focus and approach to this second process review.[5]

**Table 1: Research questions**

| DAC criteria | # | Research questions |
|---|---|---|
| **Relevance** | A1 | • Have the assumptions underpinning the design and implementation of the mentorship component held during implementation? |
| | A2 | • Does the intervention design for the EIP provide sufficient flexibility to respond to changes in the context of implementation, or upon evidence generated by the programme? |
| **Coherence** | B1 | • How coherent is the EIP delivery system for mentorship with other GoK systems and programmes?<br>• Were the appropriate stakeholders involved in the implementation of EIP mentorship? |
| | B2 | • To what extent are coordination, linkages, roles, and responsibilities working between different levels of government and between government departments as it relates to the implementation of mentorship? |
| **Effectiveness** | C1 | • To what extent has the mentorship component delivered its intended scope and reach? |
| | C2 | • What capacities do stakeholders think have to be in place at all levels of government for the EIP to function (at pilot and at scale)?<br>• To what extent are effective training and capacity-building arrangements in place and successfully implemented? |
| | C3 | • To what extent have the systems to deliver mentorship been set up?<br>• To what extent do stakeholders think that the GoK developed the capacity to implement these systems independently? |
| **Efficiency** | D1 | • To what extent has the mentorship component been delivered within the expected time and resource requirements?<br>• How can the delivery of the mentorship component be more efficient? |
| **Sustainability** | E1 | • To what extent does the GoK have the capacity to continue to implement the mentorship approach as it was designed? |
| | E2 | • To what extent does the GoK have the capacity to scale the mentorship approach as it was designed. |

Note: The research questions have been slightly modified since the submission of the process review design note as more information on programme implementation has become available. These refinements do not alter the scope of the review but serve to tighten the focus of the research questions.

---

[5]    The purpose of this report is not to answer each evaluation question directly, but the findings and analysis presented in this report have informed and directed the research.

## 2.5    Data sources and analysis

**This report has drawn on both primary and secondary data sources collected and synthesised between March and September 2023.**  The bulk of data collection was conducted between March and June 2023; some additional secondary data (revisions to programme documentation and administrative data form the programme's management information system) were obtained between June and September.  The evaluation team was able to work freely without any interference and to follow their chosen approach and methods, collect data without constraints, and analyse the findings without any undue influence.

**The key primary sources for process review findings are qualitative**, derived from key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) conducted at the national, county, and sub-county levels. Transcripts and notes were coded thematically to support analysis using NVivo.  Qualitative insights have been framed with quantitative description of key parameters of mentorship obtained from the programme's monitoring data.

**Primary data collection for the review of mentoring was conducted between mid-April and mid-June 2023.**  Between the 9th and 18th May, OPM staff accompanied two RGA staff (one interviewer / facilitator and one note-taker) to collect data from three sub-counties in the EIP programme area (Saku in Marsabit County and Mwatate and Taveta in Taita Taveta County).  The selection of these sites was based on several considerations:

- This sample enabled analysis to capture variations in mentoring approach and experience between Model A (in Marsabit and in Mwatate Sub-County of Taita Taveta) and Model B (in Taveta Sub-County of Taita Taveta).
- The sample sought to understand how mentoring processes and results might vary depending on local context.  Marsabit is a large, arid and sparsely-populated county with a high poverty rate (64%), while Taita Taveta is a smaller, semi-arid county with a lower poverty rate (32%).
- These counties overlap with the impact evaluation's sample.  The baseline survey provided data on variations in local conditions (e.g. on variations in poverty, demographics and economic activity) which helped to contextualise findings on EIP implementation and results.

**Table 1 Sub-national sampling for qualitative data collection**

| County | Poverty rate | Sub-county | Economic inclusion model | EIP participants | Covered by impact evaluation? | Mentoring process review | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | KIIs | FGDs |
| Marsabit | 64% | North Horr | A | 334 | Y | 1 | |
| | | Saku | A | 518 | Y | 2 | 1 |
| | | Country level | | | Y | 2 | 1 |
| Taita Taveta | 32% | Mwatate | A | 568 | Y | 2 | 1 |
| | | Taveta | B | 636 | Y | 2 | 1 |
| | | Country level | | | Y | 3 | 1 |
| Makueni | 35% | | A and B | 1,280 | N | - | - |
| Muranga | 25% | | A and B | 1,305 | N | - | - |
| Kisumu | 34% | | B | 1,050 | Y | - | - |

*Source: Kenya Bureau of Statistics (2016) Basic Report on wellbeing in Kenya 2015/16 Table 4.3: Overall poverty estimates (individual) by residence and county, 2015/16.*

**In each county, the researchers met with a range of local actors engaged in the EIP.** KIIs and FGDs were conducted with EIP participants, the staff of BOMA and Village Enterprise (mentors, mentor supervisors and county programme managers) and local government (County Commissioners, County Coordinators for Social Development, and Sub-County Social Development Officers). Focus groups with participants included both men and women in mixed groups: 60% of those participating in the FGDs were female, and the training of the facilitators and notetakers emphasised the need to ensure equal engagement from male and female participants in the FGDs. The list of data collection exercises conducted in both counties can be found in Annex C.

**Findings from these sub-national exercises informed the topics and interview questions which were included in subsequent interviews with national-level stakeholders.** KIIs were conducted with Nairobi-based representatives from DSD, GDI, BOMA, Village Enterprise, the World Bank, and Development Pathways (a consultancy firm contracted to develop the EIP module for DSD's Community Development MIS). A few of these meetings were held in late April and the remainder completed between 22$^{nd}$ May and 8$^{th}$ June.[6] While some interviews with national-level stakeholders were conducted bilaterally, others were conducted in a group setting. KIIs with Nairobi-based individuals included both face-to-face interviews and interviews conducted remotely over Teams. Some key informants were interviewed more than once. Annex D lists those who were interviewed at the national level.

**Finally, draft findings and conclusions were presented and discussed at a two-day validation workshop held in Nairobi on the 6$^{th}$ and 7$^{th}$ June.** This brought together both Nairobi-based staff from central Government (DSD, DSA and others), the implementing consortium (GDI, BOMA and Village Enterprise) and the Government's development partners (the World Bank and FCDO); and a number of staff from county and sub-county levels of EIP implementation and local government. This workshop provided a valuable opportunity to check findings and debate conclusions and recommendations for future action, at a point when DSD and GDI were considering the options for implementing phase 2, which was due to start in the third quarter of 2023.

**In addition to the primary data collected specifically for this process review, the report also draws on secondary data sources.** These have included:

- **Review of EIP programme documentation:** Relevant programme documentation (e.g. the Operational Manual and GDI monitoring reports) was reviewed to understand programme design and implementation processes (e.g. the various roles assigned to mentors and the factors that determined their ability to perform these roles as planned).
- **Review of literature on economic inclusion programmes:** The team conducted a rapid review of the existing evidence base on economic inclusion programming and (where available) specifically on the role of mentors, drawing on both evaluations of pilot programmes in Kenya (e.g. Gobin and Santos 2015; Sanders 2019; Gallardo et al 2021) and international literature (e.g. Andrews et al 2021; Bedoya et al 2019; Kunaka and Moos 2019Balattman and Ralston 2015).
- **Analysis of programme monitoring data:** Programme monitoring data was provided by the GDI consortium in mid-April in the form of downloads of MIS data into Excel spreadsheets. This enabled the production of some headline descriptive statistics with regard to participants, mentors and VSLAs which help to frame the accounts provided in the qualitative data.

---

[6] Since key informants were selected based on their position in relevant organisations, no stratification by gender or other social characteristics was employed.

## 2.6    Data collection instruments

**Data collection instruments were designed to address the research questions while avoiding bias.**  A formal pre-testing was not considered necessary for this study given the qualitative and iterative nature of the data that was collected (in which early interviews identified issues to be addressed in subsequent exercises); the small pool of possible respondents (particularly for key informant interviews) and the need to tailor KIIs to organisational and individual variations; and time and resource constraints.

**While the instruments did not undergo formal pre-testing, their development was informed by previous rounds of qualitative data collection.**  The design of KIIs and FGDs drew on both ongoing interactions with key stakeholders in the EIP, and qualitative data collection exercises with both national and county / sub-county level stakeholders during earlier KSEIP MEK studies. The instruments benefited from sequencing and iteration: in-depth interviews with GoK and GDI staff at the national level provided critical insights into the relevant issues and ensured that the instruments used later (e.g. the checklists used in FGDs) were tailored to capture the necessary data accurately.

**The validity of FGD questions was tested through piloting with a semi-structured group interview with mentor supervisors.** The group was composed primarily of mentor supervisors working outside our evaluation area. This discussion served as an organic testing ground and helped to refine the direction and focus of the questions. During this session, selected questions from the instruments were posed to participants, allowing for an assessment of their clarity, relevance, and the reliability of the responses they elicited.

**In addition to piloting topics and questions, a number of other strategies were used to ensure rigour in the design of the data collection instruments.**  These included regular debriefing of the researchers involved in sub-national data collection to discuss any challenges or ambiguities encountered with the instruments, allowing for ongoing refinements; providing FGD participants with the opportunity to provide feedback on their responses, ensuring the accuracy and completeness of the data captured; and triangulation of data sources (interviews, group discussions and document analysis) to identify any potential issues with the instruments and enhance the robustness and validity of the findings.  This process of iterative development, grounded in direct engagement with stakeholders and potential respondents, provided a solid foundation for the instruments. This approach helped to ensure that the final questions were relevant to the study's aims and understandable to the participants.

## 2.7    Identifying and mitigating bias

**The process review seeks to provide an objective assessment of the mentoring component of the EIP.**  To achieve this, the research team sought to identify and address any potential biases that might arise from the methods used for collecting data. In the context of this second process review, imbalances or biases could have arisen due to the size of the respondent pool; the type of respondent and their availability; and the selection of individuals who were interviewed.

**Selection bias might result from the availability and willingness of respondents to participate in KIIs.** It proved challenging to complete all the planned KIIs due to the limited availability of respondents. This could lead to a sample bias, in which the views and experiences of those who were available and willing to be interviewed may not be representative of the broader (relatively small) set of key stakeholders.

**Another potential source of bias could be linked to the turnover of senior officials who were closely involved with the EIP.** This may have affected the degree to which it is possible to obtain a continuity of insights into the programme's origins and evolution. The inability to interview the former DSD Deputy Director, who played a significant role in overseeing the EIP since its inception, could introduce an informational bias, where the data collected lacks the depth and context that could have been provided by this key figure.

**The framing of the evaluation topic may have influenced respondents' perspectives and the replies they gave during interviews.** Since mentorship was identified by the GDI-led consortium as a critical element in the success of economic inclusion programming, there is a potential bias towards the consortium's role being seen and presented as indispensable. Those involved in the consortium component of the implementation team may have had an interest in portraying their role in the mentorship process as one that is crucial, and which should be maintained in the next phase of the programme. This potential bias is heightened by the fact that the Government, which is to take over implementation in the future, lacks prior experience with a programmatic approach to mentorship for economic inclusion. The consortium's insights might be biased towards communicating their perception of the necessity of their continued involvement to deliver the EIP at scale. This could lead to a skewed representation of the mentorship component's efficacy and the Government's readiness to assume full responsibility.

**The research team employed several strategies to mitigate these potential biases.** The review process included a comprehensive examination of the mentorship component's strengths and limitations within different operational contexts (Model A and Model B) and considering the Government's nascent experience in this field. In doing so, the review seeks to provide an objective and balanced assessment of the required resources and personnel and compare this to the Government's capacity to independently implement mentoring activities. Efforts were made to include a wide range of respondents – including those newly appointed to key roles – to ensure diversity in terms of roles, experiences, and perspectives within the EIP. This helped mitigate the risk of a non-representative sample. The review triangulates data (both qualitative and quantitative) and perspectives to reach nuanced evaluative judgements and avoid the potential biases from any single source. Existing documentation and MIS data were reviewed to cross-check respondents' recollections and views. Finally, follow-up interviews were sought with respondents who were initially unavailable, or to return to talk again with respondents at the national level on findings from the county level.

## 2.8    Approach to research ethics

**As noted in Section 1.4, the targeting and mentoring process reviews have been undertaken under the overall MEK approach to evaluation management.** The Inception Report describes the approach taken to evaluation governance, research ethics, quality assurance, data protection, safeguarding, and conflicts of interest in designing and delivering the MEK package (Inception Report, OPM, 2021b).[7] No members of the evaluation team (OPM and RGA staff) had any conflict of interest with regards to the EIP programme.

**The review has followed the principles and standards specified in FCDO's Ethical Guidance for Research, Evaluation and Monitoring Activities (DFID 2019).** The "Do no harm" principle has been followed throughout the evaluation to ensure that expectations are not unduly raised,

---

[7]    While it was not possible to constitute a formal Evaluation Advisory Group as originally envisaged in the Inception Report, the main stakeholders have been consulted separately at key points throughout the work of the MEK component.

confidentiality is maintained, respondents are never forced to participate or encouraged to speak about subjects that may be traumatising and that all activities are appropriate (including with regards to age, disability, gender, diversity, among other dimensions).. Prior to data collection, we obtained verbal informed consent from each respondent[8], clearly explaining the purpose of the evaluation and the voluntary nature of their involvement. Respondents were also notified that they reserved the right not to answer a question or withdraw their consent at any point during the interview.

**Precautions have been taken to protect data stored on OPM's servers, maintain confidentiality and anonymity and safeguard sensitive information.** During analysis, data is assessed for any potential risks or harm that could arise from the dissemination of sensitive findings.  To protect the privacy of those involved while still providing insights relevant to the review, quotes from KIIs and FGDs refer to the institutional affiliation of the individual or in the case of quotes from programme participants, a simple latter-number code and a note on the individual's gender.

## 2.9    Use and influence plan

**The process review is intended to generate findings and recommendations of value both to EIP stakeholders and a broader global community of practice.**  The primary use objective of this report (and the previous process report on targeting) was to support the design and implementation of Phase 2 of the EIP with evidence-based recommendations derived from analysis of Phase 1 .

**Most directly and immediately, this was to be achieved through a learning workshop held in Nairobi from 6th to 7th June 2023** (see 2.5 above)**.**  Discussion at this workshop focused on stakeholders' responses to findings and recommendations in the first draft submission of this report, and on how to reflect these in planning for the provision of mentoring in Cohort 2. The agenda for this workshop is included for reference as Annex E.

**A revised draft of this report was shared with Government, the GDI consortium, and development partners (FCDO and the World Bank) in September 2023.**  This final report reflects comments received on that draft.  The dissemination of this report will contribute to improved development results through the following:

- The report will be made available, and headline findings summarised, at a workshop in Nairobi in February 2024.  The focus of this workshop will be the findings from the midline of the EIP impact evaluation (workstream 4): but these will be contextualised and triangulated with the findings on mentoring in this report.

- Subject to EQUALS approval, the report will be made available on the OPM website; along with a short, plain English *Policy Brief*, approximately 10 pages in length, which will be produced to summarise key lessons for an international audience.

- Any opportunities for wider dissemination of the results of the review - for instance  through journal publication or presentation in stakeholder forums, knowledge networks or research conferences - will be discussed with FCDO.

---

[8]   Written consent may not be appropriate in this context given the low levels of literacy amongst the target population for the intervention.

- Appropriate arrangements for the storage and accessibility of information collected through the review will be put in place. Outputs and evidence material will be securely stored on OPM's server so as to guarantee availability for consultation if required (e.g. to check the validity of review findings against evidence), while protecting confidentiality.

- It is hoped that this report will help to inform the 2024 Project Completion Report (PCR) for FCDO's support to HSNP and the broader KSEIP.  The PCR will be reviewed and approved by FCDO management and made publicly available on DevTracker[9].

## 2.10  Limitations

**There are several limitations to the process review that are worth highlighting.**

- The scope of this process review has been designed to conform to the resource envelope available for this workstream. The process review does not cover questions on the overall cost, cost-effectiveness, or cost-efficiency of mentoring.  It considers stakeholders' perceptions on the capacity within the GoK to run and scale up the EIP, but does not include a fully-fledged capacity assessment of the GoK's capacity to deliver the EIP.

- Implementation of phase 1 of the EIP deviated considerably from the sequencing intended in the programme's design as difficulties in targeting and enrolment resulted in (i) a much-delayed start to mentoring and (ii) subsequent delays and lumping of payments to participants.  Mentors have had to adapt how they plan and deliver their role.  As such, this review assesses mentoring as it has actually been practiced in the EIP: but it also attempts to assess the credibility of the mentorship model as it was designed, based on the theory of change.

- Availability of respondents posed a challenge to completing all KIIs as planned. This issue was exacerbated by several senior officials who were closely involved with the EIP leaving the GoK. Most notably, the research team was not able to interview the DSD Deputy Director who had overseen the EIP since its inception and was closely involved in the design and implementation of the programme's targeting.

---

[9]  See the DevTracker site for FCDO support to the KSEIP MEK component: DevTracker Programme GB-COH-03122495-A3967 (fcdo.gov.uk), accessed 15th January 2024.

# 3    Findings

## 3.1    Relevance

### 3.1.1  Have the assumptions underpinning the design and implementation of the mentorship component held during implementation?

**Neither the theory of change articulated in the *EIP Monitoring and Evaluation Framework,* nor that in the OPM Theory of Change addendum provide detailed assumptions specifically about the role of the mentors.**  However, the theory of change does lay out assumptions relating to how the *combination* of financial assistance (consumption support and asset transfers) and mentoring (training, advice, facilitation of business group and VSLA formation and operations) will enable participants to start and sustain livelihoods and so work their way out of poverty (Box 3). From these, we identify three assumptions relating *specifically* to mentorship within the EIP.

---

**Box 3: Assumptions underpinning the design of the EIP**

- **Assumption 1 (activity to output): Individuals face household-level barriers – lack of assets, income, skills and knowledge – that prevent economic inclusion.**  The first explicit assumption relates to the relevance of the economic inclusion approach, and the assumed importance of the EIP in providing a complementary package of mentoring (skills and knowledge) and finance (consumption support and asset transfers).

- **Assumption** 2 (output to outcome): Perceived benefits of business and engaging in VSLAs outweigh opportunity costs.  The second addresses how the participants targeted by the EIP perceive the programme and their willingness to engage with it.

- **Assumption 3 (output to outcome): Beneficiaries choose to invest in productive activities.** Finally, the third assumption is that, with the help of mentors, participants invest their time and the money that the programme provides in productive activities.

Source: OPM (2021) *Evaluation of the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) Phase 3 KSEIP economic inclusion draft theory of change note (Addendum 3).*  October 2021 p. 3.

---

*Assumption 1: The advice and facilitation provided by the mentors, and the manner in which it is provided, address the barriers and opportunities facing poor households.*

**The services provided by mentors were clearly relevant, addressing barriers and opportunities faced by programme participants.**  Focus group discussions in Marsabit and Taita Taveta suggested that training provided by mentors was seen as relevant to the needs and opportunities of EIP participants and valued by them.

> *Interviewer:  Is there anything you think should be changed about the things you are trained on?*
> *R2 (female): I have loved all the trainings done for us. But if you have more training, we would like to learn.*
> *Interviewer:  What trainings do you feel you need that you currently don't have?*
> *R7 (male):   We have been well taught. We would like more ideas on other businesses.*
> *(FGD, Marsabit)*

**The finding that mentoring was relevant to EIP participants is in line with international evidence.**  Impact evaluations have shown that addressing these constraints by increasing the

assets available to the poor can indeed help them to achieve sustained gains in income which lift them permanently out of poverty (see for example Balboni et al 2022). Through both material support and the psycho-social element of mentoring, economic inclusion programming also helps to address the issue of low cognitive bandwidth and impaired decision making associated with the poverty and vulnerability (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013)[10].

**The group-based approach to training and support was widely but not universally endorsed by participants.** The FGDs examined the degree to which participants saw the group-based approach to business formation that the EIP employed as appropriate to their needs and constraints; and, following on from this, the way that mentors delivered training to groups, rather than on a one-to-one basis.

**Views on this aspect of the mentorship model were mixed.** All of those questioned wanted training to be delivered in a group setting, and valued the mentors' support to participants in establishing sustainable VSLA groups. With some variations, the two focal areas of the mentors' work – supporting VSLA formation and functioning, and supporting the formation and growth of businesses – were seen as quite tightly linked, with VSLA meetings providing an additional forum for the mentors to provide advice and support to businesses.

**However, if there was consensus about the value of delivering training in a group setting, there was a spectrum of views on the programme's strong direction towards group-based businesses**, and the provision of post-training mentor visits and advice to groups of two to three participants collaborating on a shared business, rather than to individual participants. While some participants saw value to running their business as part of a group (due to economies of scale in pooling money in one larger and more viable business; avoiding having multiple small businesses of the same type competing in the locality; benefiting from sharing ideas and abilities; and covering for each other during illness or other family emergencies), others would have preferred that the EIP support them in an individual enterprise (avoiding the risk that one member might betray the trust of the others, and providing flexibility to take a greater or lesser profit out of the business as they might need it for pressing consumption needs, such as paying school fees or healthcare costs).

> *When we come together as a group, we can combine our money and start a bigger business. If we were alone, we would not have enough money to start a big business.*
>
> *When we work in a group, we can share the work. If one person is sick, the others can still open the shop and make money.*
>
> *When you work alone, you have full control over your business. You know exactly how much you are making and how much you are spending.*
>
> *(various participants, FGD, Mwatate).*

---

[10] This is not to imply that the constraints addressed by the EIP were necessarily the *only* constraints to economic inclusion. The barriers that the programme addresses – lack of skills, knowledge and access to capital – relate to individual or household-level endowments. However, the literature on vulnerability and poverty traps highlights that the prospects for the economic transformation of the poor are affected by other factors, too. Local and national factors affecting opportunities and living standards include social norms and community relations, transport links and macroeconomic shifts which create economic opportunities beyond the locality, and the national political economy (Dercon 2008). The gain in human capital provided by mentoring is clearly relevant, and particularly effective in combination with the increase in capital and access to credit that EIP also provides. However, it is important to recognise that EIP participants also face constraints which the programme cannot resolve, and which need to be addressed through complementary investments in infrastructure, service delivery and economic transformation.

*Assumption 2: Participants perceive benefits from engaging with mentors*

**Participants were very positive about the service they received from the mentors.**
Discussion of the mentors' roles in providing training, support to business group and VSLA formation, and advice to individual participant households drew out examples that point to a high level of participant satisfaction with mentorship – even if, given delays in the programme start and subsequent payments, many participant households were yet to see significant increases in income from their new businesses.

> *Interviewer:* Overall what can you say about the process of training, selecting your businesses, making profits and running your businesses? How have you gained?
>
> …
>
> *P3 (female):* We are able to keep track of our finances and hence are able to allocate enough for food. And also allocate some for savings.
>
> *P4 (female):* I have had financial discipline. The savings I have are carefully allocated because I know I have a loan to pay back. Before this programme I did not have this kind of financial discipline…
>
> *P3 (female):* Before this programme begun, I was running my business for the sake of it. But after being trained, now I am doing proper book keeping and I am able to track my monies.
>
> *(FGD, Taita Taveta)*

**The degree of participant retention in the EIP seems reinforces the impression that participants perceived that mentoring provided benefits.** Monitoring data collected by the programme suggests that positive perceptions of the programme (including mentors) expressed in the FGDs are broadly representative of satisfaction among the participant population. Of a total 7,586 individual who were ever targeted for enrolment, only 139 (1.8%) voluntarily declined or withdrew[11]. Given that participation in the EIP demanded a considerable commitment of time, and requires a high degree of compliance with programme rules (e.g. attendance at all training sessions, with failure to attend penalised with a fine), this sustained engagement suggests that participants valued what they received from the programme. Particularly for the many participants who had received consumption support and asset transfers much later than planned, continued participation in the programme suggests a good degree of satisfaction with the mentoring.

*Assumption 3: The advice and support (and discipline) provided by mentors contributes to participants' success in establishing and running successful productive activities.*

**Early indicators suggest that mentoring has contributed to success in establishing viable new household enterprises.** Given the delayed start to the programme, and subsequent late and staggered payments of consumption support and asset transfers, most EIP-supported businesses were still at an early stage when primary data was collected for this review. This made it hard to identify with confidence how many were successful and sustainable, or likely to become successful in time. However, participant accounts did credit EIP mentoring with improving their business skills and helping them to establish and run businesses which were more successful than ventures they had attempted in the past; or to improve how they ran an existing business.

---

[11]   Excel file EIP VSLA 11.04.2023, supplied by GDI April 2023. Model A and Model B used somewhat different categories to record participant status and reasons for change in this status. Model A reports included 'Declined Program.Deactivate', 'Rejected the Program', 'Submitted exit letter', 'Not Interested in the program', 'Exited. Refused to be in the programme. Wrote an exit letter', 'Exited. Not interested in the Programme' and 'Exited the Program'; Model B coded all voluntary exits under 'EIP participant withdrawal / decline'.

> *Interviewer:* What were you trained on about the business plan?
>
> *P4 (female):* As an individual, I've learnt how to run a business for example; I've learnt how to do proper bookkeeping and customer care. I've learnt that when I am nice to my customers they come back. Before I got training in this program, I used to run my own business. So, I would open it and run it for some time then shut it down. Then I would open another and run it for some time then shut it down. But since I have been trained on how to do business, I have never shut down the business that I opened since October of last year because I have learnt on how to plan my work, where to buy my stock and how to talk to my customers.

> *Interviewer:* You are still running a salon business that you were running before you were selected for this project?
>
> *P3 (female):* Yes, I had my own salon. But it was not doing well at the time compared to now.
>
> *(FGD, Taita Taveta)*

> *P2 (male):* Before this programme started, I was jobless. But now I have a source of income.
>
> *(FGD, Taita Taveta)*

**Participants also credited the facilitation that mentors provided with enabling them to form VSLAs.** Discussions in the focus groups noted that the principles and guidance provided by the mentors helped them to form VSLAs which functioned better than previous arrangements for saving and lending money.

> *P6 (female):* we used to do savings locally. But it had no progress because we were afraid of each other. But here when we got a mentor, they told us that we can only lend to someone in relation to the amount they have saved…After we formed this group and got trained on VSLA, we discovered where we were making mistakes.
>
> *(FGD, Taita Taveta)*

### 3.1.2 Does the intervention design for the EIP provide sufficient flexibility to respond to changes in the context of implementation, or upon evidence generated by the programme?

**The mentoring component has had to respond to a number of challenges.** Some of these challenges relate to changes in participants' needs and opportunities; others derive from problems in other aspects of programme implementation which have had consequences for mentoring.

**As would be expected in a very rural local economy, livelihood opportunities are strongly influenced by the weather.** Broadly predictable seasonal variations have been complicated by climatic variability, with a pronounced drought occurring since the programme began. Participants noted occasions when businesses that had been profitable when there were rains (in particular, raising livestock) had been less successful during the drought, and vice versa. Selling water and vegetables were profitable during the drought, and became less so once the rains resumed. This is challenging for participants, who have limited capacity to spread their investments and time between different activities, or switch course over time; and for the mentors, in supporting these decisions.

**The programme seems to have managed to provide the required flexibility, at least in some instances.** This household-level flexibility reflects in part the size of the asset transfers provided by the EIP (which are larger than in many earlier graduation programmes in Kenya): but it also reflects in large part a model of mentorship which provided the appropriate frequency and quality of contact between participants and mentors.

> *I started off selling mandazi, ice lollies and charcoal. This was during the drought period. Over time the business was not doing well. My mentor came to visit me and advised me to change to a different type of business. So, I changed to selling livestock which is currently doing well. (FGD, Marsabit)*

**Delivery of mentoring has also had to adjust to deal with problems in other aspects of EIP implementation.** Delayed and staggered enrolment process, and later delays in payments of consumption support and asset transfers, significantly disrupted the carefully synchronised scheduling of different programme activities that was laid out in the programme's design.

**Most importantly, mentors had to adapt to supporting a much larger than anticipated number of businesses.** The intent, strongly signalled to participants, was that two or three participants would come together to pool their funds, ideas, skills and time in a shared business which would be more viable that a business run by just one participant on their own. In many cases, however, three participants would initially agree to work together, but then struggle to proceed when only two of the three received their asset transfer on time. Such situations created considerable difficulties and led to many participants establishing businesses on their own rather than to wait for an indeterminate period until their intended business partners were able to invest. As a result, mentors found themselves advising a much larger number of much smaller businesses.

**Mentors (supported by mentor supervisors and county coordinators) adjusted well by revising their workplans.** Training topics were re-run when mentors and / or participants felt that too much time had elapsed and participants needed refresher training to make good use of their money once they had received their much-delayed payments. Mentors also adjusted their workplans to manage the larger-than-planned number of smaller-than-planned business groups: but GDI noted that the issue damaged the credibility and morale of mentors.

**It is not clear what contributed to the adaptability demonstrated by mentors and mentor supervisors under phase 1**: or, by extension, what would be needed to replicate this capacity in future implementation of the programme at scale through Government systems. It seems likely that careful attention to recruitment, insistence that mentors were recruited from and retained in the communities they served, and full-time support from mentor supervisors all contributed to performance.

## 3.2 Coherence

### 3.2.1 How coherent is the EIP delivery system for mentorship with other GoK systems and programmes?

**The EIP system for mentoring is novel for the Government, which makes it hard to achieve coherence.** The EIP pilot represents an innovative programme model in respect to GoK systems and programmes, particularly with regard to its workforce requirements. As a new programme, drawing on NGO experience and practice, it is unsurprising that there is currently a lack of coherence between the EIP approach to mentorship and existing GoK systems and programmes[12]. Specifically, there is no direct equivalent to the roles of mentor or mentor supervisor currently existing in Government service.

---

[12] The question of coherence between EIP systems and those currently existing in Government with regard to mentoring differs significantly from the earlier discussion of coherence between EIP and GoK systems with regard to targeting, which was addressed by the first process review report (OPM 2023). Targeting on the basis of poverty is something that the Government does already for other programmes, and for which it has developed systems with which the EIP might reasonably be expected to align (even if the EIP had to add a focus on household capacity as well as household need). Mentoring by contrast is something that GoK has not undertaken prior to the EIP.

**There is a potential coherence between the role of EIP mentor supervisor (currently provided by the GDI-led consortium, under contract to DSD) and the existing GoK role of Sub-Country Social Development Officer (SCSDO)[13].** This resemblance of roles could assist in the transition to implementation through GoK systems at the end of the phase 1 pilot, if SCSDOs take on the role of mentor supervisor. However, SCSDOs are often heavily over-burdened, with responsibility for managing targeting and numerous existing social programmes. This reality has been reflected in the considerable variation in the extent to which SCDOs in different areas actively engaged with EIP mentors and mentor supervisors during the pilot.

> *They do not have the time, honestly. There is only one SDO in the whole Sub County here and [it] is quite vast. This SDO is the one doing registration, is in charge of payments, if there is anything to do with social protection, they are the ones who are in charge of that. They have a lot of information. Their work load is too much. I am looking again at adding 682 participants, with 310 [business] groups. How is she going to manage and how is she supposed to visit those on a monthly basis? Even if you divide, it will take a whole year to visit each group. She will need 310 days. That means that she will not be working in her office.     (Mentor supervisor)*

**If it is possible to see at least potential coherence between mentor supervisors and SCSDOs, there remains a problematic lack of coherence between EIP pilot arrangements and current GoK systems with regard to the larger cadre of mentors.** For the Government to take on 15 mentors in each sub-county would require a major adjustment. The GDI consortium and DSD agreed that it would be possible to define a GoK mentor role which would be compatible with GoK employment rules and still largely mirror the current role in terms of job description, qualifications, and salary. However, bringing mentors onto the Government payroll would require Treasury approval. Obtaining this approval will require considerable investment of political capital by the programme leadership in DSD, particularly in light of current fiscal pressures and a civil service hiring freeze.

### 3.2.2 Were the appropriate stakeholders involved in the implementation of EIP mentorship?

**The level of local GoK engagement in mentoring during phase 1 has been variable.** The implementing consortium perceived that Government staff were in general involved more intensively in earlier phases of activity (Government staff observed the training that was provided to participants; and, before that, collaborated in targeting and enrolment); but were less involved in later stages of ongoing mentoring. Participation of GoK staff in the bi-weekly groups sessions, when mentors and mentor supervisors came together for training and discussion, was a valuable opportunity for two-way learning to shape the evolution of the programme.

> *"We've had the sub county development officers and the county coordinators join the teams in the field and during this training they are also able to learn and interrogate, ask questions, give inputs on things that they feel like this is not working… - I think that was a good moment for them also to give guidance because there are things that we think this is how we want to do it, and then you are told because it's government there is 1, 2, 3 protocol that needs to be followed."                              (Village Enterprise)*

**County- and sub-county staff with other commitments have not always been able to attend these bi-weekly meetings.** This has limited the scope for capacity development in advance of the transition to phase 2. In the absence of a structured way of engaging – i.e., clear instruction from

---

[13]   In principle, there should be two SCSDOs – one lead and one deputy – in each sub-county. In practice, however, the deputy SCSDO role was unfilled in many of the sub-countries in which the EIP operated.

higher levels to SDOs that they were expected to attend the EIP bi-weeklies - there have been considerable differences between locations.  In some, the SDO was described as being 'religious' in attendance and rarely if ever missing a biweekly meeting; whereas in other locations the SDO attends only occasionally (perhaps due to responsibilities relating to a greater number of other programmes).  Participants in FGDs could name the local DSD official, but noted that he was not involved in providing the training, but only in follow-up activities.

> *Some of the guys who are who have been part of it, you can literally allow them to do their programme and they understand almost everything that we've been doing, they're able to attenuate the processes, they're able to answer questions without you guiding them because they know and they've been part of the team. But you realize a little bit different for those who have not been part of it. And they will always be asking questions, trying to, you know, ask one, two, "how do you do that?  Why do you do that?"   (Village Enterprise)*

> *With the DSD, we cannot say that he has a regular or a well-organized schedule that is made.*                                                                    *(Mentors' FGD, Mwatate)*

> *You find that maybe he does not have the facilitation ([i.e. payments for travel costs] to come. During that time when I am doing my monitoring and mentoring, he or she does not have that time to come and visit me so that we can work together and learn about what I am doing.*                                                                    *(Mentors' FGD, Mwatate)*

**To succeed, the EIP also requires effective central capacity in leadership, management and oversight of the programme.**  Within DSD, there is a team of technical experts managing EIP with responsibility for, for example, the management information system, social safeguards, or statistics.    This team will need to manage the programme once leadership is transferred from GDI to GoK. The GDI-led consortium who have been implementing Phase  1 have concerns that this Nairobi-based DSD team is capable, but much fewer in number than their equivalents in the GDI consortium.

> *Government capacity is really core.  We need to think through who mirrors the programme managers and M&E leads in phase  1.  DSD has a very lean team – the programme will need more resources from the Government to work well – for example, how to get the Mentor Guidebook into the curriculum of the School of Government.  For the mentorship cadre to work, there has to be a huge team behind them. (GDI)*

**The DSD team themselves are however less concerned.**  They note that while partners see only about four or five of them, there is a considerably larger team of about 15 who are engaged in supporting the EIP (even if not all in a full-time capacity).

**Staff turnover in Government has exacerbated problems with limited capacity.**  GoK civil service processes involve in a high degree of staff rotation – at sub-national levels, between locations (counties and sub-counties) and at the central level, between different units and departments.  Change in SCSDO and County Coordinator positions during the implementation of EIP was mentioned as being problems in Murang'a, Makueni and Kisumu counties.  In Nairobi, the small core DSD technical team has remained stable, but senior Directorate leadership roles in both DSD and DSA have changed.

> *[We] have not had consistent leadership, at every level… It's not possible to have strong implementation if government can't commit to sustained staffing.  If all the people who've seen it have left, they're not going to get it from the Operational Manual. (GDI)*

### 3.2.3 To what extent are coordination, linkages, roles, and responsibilities working between different levels of government and between government departments as it relates to the implementation of mentorship?

**The EIP is premised on the need to deliver a package of financial and technical support to targeted households in a carefully scheduled and synchronised manner.** The programme as a whole therefore requires a high degree of coordination between different parts of Government. In particular, it requires effective communication and synchronisation of activities between the DSD and the DSA.

- The DSD provides overall leadership of the programme, has staff present at county and sub-county level, and is responsible for the work of the mentors. If the Government does take on responsibility for implementing the EIP directly (rather than, as in the pilot phase, contracting it out to an NGO consortium), it will be the DSD that employs the mentors. This implies that there should be relatively few complications arising from a need for horizontal coordination between Government structures when it comes to recruiting, training and managing mentors (and mentor supervisors): these functions should rest clearly with the DSD.

- The DSA administers the operational aspects of the Consolidated Cash Transfer Programme (CCTP), which brings together the three national transfer programmes. In implementing the EIP, the DSA is critical for key functions including enrolment, establishing arrangements for consumption support and asset transfer payments to be made into participants' bank accounts, and managing data on these payments, including making changes when necessary to reflect the death or migration of a named participant.

**While the mentoring function sits clearly with the DSD, as noted above, mentors have to date also performed a variety of additional, non-mentoring roles.** If this approach is retained in the next phase, some of these auxiliary, non-mentorship roles *will* require that mentors coordinate with DSD, specifically around (i) targeting and enrolment and (ii) case management.

**There are grounds to hope that the coordination of activities and decisions around targeting between DSD and DSA will be greatly improved in future phases of the EIP.** Arrangements for targeting future rounds of the EIP can draw on lessons learned during the pilot phase (OPM, 2023) and should benefit from improvements (e.g. the Enhanced Single Registry or ESR) which were only completed after the EIP pilot started.

**By contrast, as of June 2023 EIP case management continued to cause problems for EIP mentors.** The implementing consortium reported that poor communication has significantly delayed resolution of case management changes necessitated by the death or migration of an EIP participant. This process should take a couple of weeks but during the pilot was taking months, during which time EIP payments are still being made into dormant participant bank accounts. In June, pending change requests were reported to be stretching back to January 2023. These delays are attributable to a number of issues reflecting a lack of coordination vertically and horizontally within Government.

- As a GoK programme, the EIP must follow official procedures in replacing or removing participants in the programme. In the case of the death of a participant, these procedures to halt payments to the deceased's bank account (and, possibly, replace them with a different member of the same household) typically require a death certificate or burial permit, which participants have sometimes struggled to obtain. Mentors or mentor supervisors submit this information, along with a corresponding form detailing the case, to the County Coordinator to approve. It is then moved on to DSA to upload the request to change payment arrangements

on the Consolidated Cash Transfer Programmes Management Information System (CCTP-MIS), which is managed by the DSA.

- DSA staff are often slow to approve or reject EIP case management change requests. There is sometimes only one person reviewing cases at the central level who is reviewing and approving requests: they are responsible not only for the EIP but also case management for the much larger national cash transfer programmes. In part because of this workload, DSD generally collates changes to be resolved in a batch in the next disbursement cycle rather than implementing changes as they arise.

- There is no notification sent or received once a case is forwarded. An SCSDO who wishes to check on the progress of a change request that she or he has submitted must manually review the system. There are no time bound reminders or warnings: as a result, cases can go unattended unless someone follows up on a given case number. Similarly, when a case is returned to the SCSDO as approved or rejected, it does not necessarily show up on the front page of the MIS but must be searched for.

- Finally, SCSDOs often struggle with the CCT-MIS, as for many of them it has been a long time since they received training on its use. It was evident that some SDOs did not know how to use filters to isolate rejected cases, spending time either searching manually or searching individually by case number.

**The combination of these issues has resulted in significant delays in replacing or removing participants in the EIP payment systems.** As mentors are involved in identifying and flagging to the SCSDO cases that require changes, these delays have taken up a disproportionate amount of their time. They have also hindered the smooth operation of the programme and created difficulties in accurately tracking and managing participant accounts.

## 3.3    Effectiveness

### 3.3.1  To what extent has the mentorship component delivered its intended scope and reach?

**The programme has succeeded in recruiting and (largely) retaining the required number and profile of mentors and mentor supervisors.** In the pilot phase of the EIP, the GDI-led consortium has achieved a ratio of one mentor to every 50 participants (149 mentors serving 6,968 active participants in April 2023)[14]. This cadre of mentors has been managed by 11 mentor supervisors, for a target ratio of one mentor supervisor for every 15 mentors. With minor variations, this mentor workforce was implemented as planned, with on average 15 mentors and one mentor supervisor in each sub-county (Table 3).

**The profile of this mentor workforce was largely as intended in the programme's design.** It proved harder to recruit female field staff in the areas in which the EIP was implemented by Model A: under Model A only 44% of mentors and 33% of mentor supervisors were women, compared to nearly 70% of mentors and 60% of mentor supervisors employed under Model B (Table 3). This was felt to reflect the somewhat greater isolation and more traditional gendered social norms of the sub-counties in which Model A operated. The data does not pick up dynamics of how male and female mentors interact with male or female participants. Interestingly, however, the MIS data shows a much higher proportion of all-female business groups (69%) in Model B than in Model A

---

[14]    The current version of the EIP Operational Manual notes that each mentor will serve a maximum of 75 participants: but phase 1 was based on a ratio of 1:50.

(48%).  This could be taken to support the inference that gender norms explain why there are fewer female mentors in Model A; *and / or* could be seen to be an outcome of that female share of the mentor cadre.

**Table 3: Mentors in the phase 1 pilot**

| EIP model | County | Sub-county | male | female | total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model A (BOMA) | Makueni | Kibwezi East | 10 | 4 | 14 |
| | Murang'a | Maragua | 6 | 7 | 13 |
| | Taita Taveta | Mwatate | 9 | 6 | 15 |
| | Marsabit | North Horr* | 6 | 9 | 15 |
| | | Saku | 6 | 9 | 15 |
| | **total** | | **37** | **35** | **72** |
| Model B (Village Enterprise) | Murang'a | Kiharu** | 6 | 9 | 15 |
| | Makueni | Mbooni | 5 | 11 | 16 |
| | Taita Taveta | Taita Taveta | 4 | 11 | 15 |
| | Kisumu | Nyando | 2 | 13 | 15 |
| | | Kisumu West | 8 | 8 | 16 |
| | **total** | | **25** | **52** | **77** |

*Source: GDI monitoring data, supplied 18th April 2023.*

\*    The mentor data supplied for Model A notes 5 mentors (2 male, 3 female) for whom the sub-county location is given as Ileret, which is formally a village and electoral ward in North Horr sub-county of Marsabit county.  In this table, these numbers for Ileret have been added to those supplied for North Horr.

\*\*   The mentor data supplied by GDI uses Murang'a East and not Kiharu; for consistency (including with the use of place names in the participant data supplied by GDI), Kiharu is used here.

**Roughly a third of mentors possessed a bachelor's degree.**  Among the remainder, roughly a quarter held a diploma as their highest qualification; another quarter held a vocational certificate; and a little over 10% possessed a secondary school certificate but had not entered post-secondary education (Table 4).  There was a broad consensus – from mentors, mentor supervisors, and participants – that it made a positive difference to recruit mentors from the communities that they went on to serve.

**Table 4: Educational profile of EIP mentors**

| Highest level of educational qualification | Model A | Model B | total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bachelors | 31% | 39% | 35% |
| Diploma | 40% | 13% | 26% |
| Certificate | 18% | 36% | 28% |
| KCSE | 11% | 12% | 11% |
| % | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| n | 72 | 77 | 149 |

*Source: GDI monitoring data, supplied 18th April 2023.*

**Once recruited, mentors received the full cycle of training as conceived in the Operational Manual[15].** This training programme appears to have been thought through well, covering a range of topics and issues: however, it was noted that there were some technical aspects of specific livelihoods (notably rearing livestock) for which mentors were not adequately trained.  It is debateable however whether the programme could or should seek to meet this need through the mentors themselves: respondents suggest that it might be preferable if mentors were better equipped to identify and secure this kind of advisory support by linking EIP businesses to the appropriate specialists (e.g. Government livestock agents: see 3.4.1 below).

**Rates of turnover among the mentor cadre were similar across the programme.**  Both models had comparable rates of staff attrition (each losing 11 of the staff that had been recruited, equivalent to c. 15% of the staff strength employed in April 2023).   Exits were more often recorded as voluntary resignations under Model A, while Model B monitoring data records a higher rate of dismissals or cases in which probationary period employment which was not extended.

**Participants' descriptions of the training and support that they had received from the mentors closely matched the intended model laid out in the Operations Manual.**  In focus group  discussions, participants stated that being trained on topics such as proper bookkeeping and record-keeping played a pivotal role in the sustainability of their businesses.

> *They taught us how to keep records of our sales and expenses. This has helped me to know if I am making a profit or a loss. Before, I was just spending money without knowing if I was making any profit*                                                                                           *(FGD Participant).*

> *Our mentors have been very helpful. They have trained us and guided us through the program. Without them, we would not have been able to start our businesses.*
> *(Mwatate Participant FGD).*

**A final key metric for the effectiveness of the mentoring component is the number of VSLAs that mentors have helped to establish and sustain.**  This too has been largely in line with the intended scope of the pilot, with 284 functional VSLAs existing in April 2023 (and only three which had been created but were no longer active).  Differences between the two models in the size of VSLAs and the rates at which participants have been able to save reflect the later introduction of VSLA formation in Model A.

---

[15]   Training employed a cascade model comprised of three layers. This starts with the mentor supervisors, who are trained on the modules of EIP and how it is to be implemented. They in turn train the mentors on the activities they are going to be carrying out with the participants. Finally, the mentors then go on to train the participants on the various activities that make up the EIP package.

**Table 5: VSLA creation**

| | County | Sub-county | VSLAs formed | VSLAs active | Average size | Average savings per participant (KSh) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model A (BOMA) | Makueni | Kibwezi | 30 | 29 | 21 | 1,316 |
| | Murang'a | Maragua | 30 | 30 | 19 | 1,996 |
| | Taita Taveta | Mwatate | 31 | 30 | 17 | 2,055 |
| | Marsabit | North Horr | 15 | 15 | 19 | 1,709 |
| | | Saku | 30 | 29 | 18 | 2,092 |
| | Model A total | | 136 | 133 | 19 | 1,836 |
| Model B (Village Enterprise) | Murang'a | Kiharu | 30 | 30 | 25 | 5,235 |
| | Makueni | Mbooni | 30 | 30 | 26 | 6,936 |
| | Taita Taveta | Taveta | 30 | 30 | 25 | 6,318 |
| | Kisumu | Nyando | 30 | 30 | 22 | 14,257 |
| | | Kisumu West | 31 | 31 | 21 | 10,260 |
| | Model B total | | 151 | 151 | 24 | 8,472 |
| **Total** | | | **287** | **284** | **21** | **5,746** |

*Source: GDI monitoring data, supplied 18th April 2023.*

### 3.3.2 What capacities do stakeholders think have to be in place at all levels of government for the EIP to function (at pilot and at scale)?  To what extent are effective training and capacity-building arrangements in place and successfully implemented?

**For the EIP to expand as was originally envisioned would require significant GoK capacity at all levels.**  Compared to more basic cash transfer programmes, poverty graduation programmes such as the EIP are labour intensive, requiring:

- a substantial workforce of frontline service delivery staff (mentors) with the experience, motivation and skills (both technical and soft skills) needed to support EIP participants;

- adequate middle management of this workforce (mentor supervisors);

- a strong central leadership function (providing strategic direction and developing and using robust systems for budget and case management, human resources management, and monitoring and evaluation); and

- well-developed coordination mechanisms between levels and line structures.

**The majority of the capacity that needs to be present needs to be built in the DSD**, which will be responsible for managing the work that mentors perform in supporting participants to make effective use of their asset transfers.  If the second phase was to move to Government implementation (as planned) and attempt to continue with the model employed in phase 1, this would imply taking on one mentor per 50 participants.  If using the same administrative structure as in phase 1, this would translate into a requirement of 15 mentors per sub-county.

**In addition to a cadre of mentors, for the EIP to function under Government implementation would require a smaller number of mentor supervisors to direct, supervise and support the work of mentors.**  Stakeholders had somewhat different views on the numbers of mentor

supervisors that would be required.  While some in Government felt that this role was more optional, the GDI-led implementing consortium felt that the mentor supervisor role was important, and that there was less scope to adjust the mentor : mentor supervisor ratio than there was to adjust the participant : mentor ratio.  One option that was raised was to ensure that there was a second, deputy SCSDO in each sub-county that implements toe EIP (at present, there is only one SCSDO); this deputy SCSDO would then be assigned to work primarily as an EIP mentor supervisor.

**While the majority of the capacity that needs to be built needs to be built within the DSD, there also needs to be some strengthening of capacity within the Directorate of Social Assistance.**  This plays a critical role in ensuring the timely payment of cash transfers for consumption support and asset transfers, and for handling case management adjustments to payment arrangements.  However, the scale of unmet needs for greater capacity within the DSA appear to be less fundamental than in DSD: it seems likely that if DSA are provided with clear leadership and direction from DSD as to what the programme requires, these improvements should be possible with relatively minor dedicated training to existing DSA staff.

### 3.3.3  To what extent have the systems to deliver mentorship been set up?  To what extent do stakeholders think that the GoK developed the capacity to implement these systems independently?

**To date, mentorship has been delivered by the GDI-led consortium under contract to DSD, with only limited participation from Government staff.**  The degree of engagement has varied, with SCSDOs and County Coordinators showing more engagement in some locations and / or at some times: but across the programme as a whole, systems for delivering mentorship are in place within the GDI-led consortium, but not to any significant extent within counties and sub-counties.

**The Government does not yet have the systems needed to supervise and support mentors.**  At the middle management level, DSD staff are heavily committed to other tasks and have often had only limited participation in the EIP pilot.  There is also considerable turnover at both sub-county and county level as staff are frequently rotated between locations: this has limited the development of GoK capacity to implement mentor supervisor roles.  GDI noted that since the start of the programme the County Coordinators of Kisumu, Makueni and Murang'a counties had all changed; as had the Sub-County Coordinator in Mwatate.  This level of churn has made it difficult for the Government to build up understanding of EIP objectives, processes and implementation issues.

**The extent to which existing systems can be translated into GoK capacity depends on decisions regarding the approach to phase 2 of the programme.**  If the mentors employed to date by BOMA and Village Enterprise were to be transferred to GoK contracts and employed as local government staff at sub-county level, it would be possible to argue that capacity *has* been built[16].  As of June 2023, this was one of the options under consideration at the validation workshop, but it was not clear that there were any plans or budgets for how to achieve this.

**The situation is better at higher levels of the DSD.**  There is a core team of technical experts (e.g. social development, MIS, and monitoring and evaluation) in Nairobi who understand the programme and have the skills and experience to manage it.  This team is capable, even if smaller

---

[16]   The current cadre of EIP mentors know the localities in which they live and work,  have been trained well and have now acquired considerable practical experience in their role.  Moving the current mentors over to Government positions would seem the best option for moving towards GoK ownership of the programme in the second phase of the pilot.

and subject to more competing demands on their time than the equivalent team of dedicated EIP leadership in the GDI-led consortium.

**Finally, there has been limited capacity in programme leadership.**  Both the head and deputy head of the EIP unit changed over the course of the period under review (and the head has changed a second time, in August 2023).  Elsewhere, the head of the Social Protection Secretariat and the head of the DSA have also changed since the programme began.  As with the turnover at County and Sub-County level, the frequent changes in programme leadership have made it harder to build GoK ownership of the EIP and hindered the accumulation of the capacity that will be needed for the Government to assume responsibility for implementing the programme themselves.

## 3.4    Efficiency

### 3.4.1   To what extent has the mentorship component been delivered within the expected time and resource requirements?  How can the delivery of the mentorship component be more efficient?

**Accounting for the delays in targeting and enrolment that set back the start of mentoring activities, mentoring has taken place within the anticipated timeframe.**  Mentors appear to have achieved all of the tasks assigned to them (e.g. on-boarding participants, providing training, and supporting the formation of business  groups and VSLAs), even if the order in which they undertook activities may have deviated significantly from what was intended as they have been forced to respond to unpredictable delays in the disbursement of consumption support and asset transfers.

**Stronger linkages to other GoK services could improve the efficiency of the mentors' role.**  Mentors noted that their work could be made more efficient if they were able to draw in technical specialists (notably, agricultural or livestock extension agents) to provide tailored support to certain types of business.  These linkages were part of the EIP design, and were reported as occurring in some of the sub-counties visited for the review; but had not been established in other areas.

> *Interviewer: Are there any areas of training that you think could be more efficient or more effective going forward whether it is in terms of structure, or content?*
>
> *Mentor Supervisor: I would say the content, especially when we look at the content for business planning because when we train, we train these participants in general… If we have participants who want to do, probably a livestock business, if we can have an agricultural officer coming on board and he is also trained, he can assist these ones who want to do the livestock business much more than me, because there are some things that I do not know.*
>
> *(Mentor supervisor)*

**Linkages to buyers might also be used to improve the efficiency of mentoring.**  GDI noted the potential for developing contract linkages with the local private sector, whereby a company would provide training and possibly inputs, in return for which the EIP-supported participant enterprises would deliver products at an agreed price and time.  As with linkages to Government extension agents, it was felt that this vertical integration would require that EIP mentors help to bring together participants into groups to achieve viable economies of scale.

> *Like those who are doing poultry, they need to be brought together, and be given specialized training on poultry. That one you can do it together with companies that have been doing poultry like KCB foundation... They have good finance, and also, they usually give the seed practical to the farmers for the chicks. They do the marketing for you, so you get the chicks. It is like a loan,*

*then you rear the chicks. Such connections could be very helpful because now, you are removing the burden from the government because the government now becomes the facilitator.*                                                                  *(GDI County Programme Manager)*

**Without access to detailed information on the budgets and spending of the GDI consortium, it is difficult to assess whether the costs of the mentoring component have been in line with what was anticipated.** GDI implementing partners have a good understanding of the cost drivers involved in delivering mentorship activities in rural Kenya, based on previous experience of BOMA and Village Enterprise in delivering other economic inclusion programmes. The challenge in implementing the EIP has been the protracted duration of work, given delays to firstly the start of the programme, and then to the release of cash transfers to participant households. It seems likely that the deviations from planned delivery has increased costs, given that mentors have had to re-run some training sessions when there has been a significant delay in the release of asset transfers.

**Reducing the mentoring 'dosage' with a shorter duration of contact between participants and mentors may also improve efficiency.** The primary decisions to be taken with regard to efficiency (and how it might be improved in the future) concern the intensity and duration of participation that is required to provide participants with the capacities needed to improve their livelihoods on a sustainable basis. Based upon previous experience, GDI believes that the duration of EIP engagement with participants could be shorter than the 18 to 24 month duration used in the phase 1 pilot, and could be reduced to 15 or possibly 12 months. Encouragingly, the relatively low rate of turnover in the mentor cadre, and the degree of motivation implied from interviews and FGDs, suggest that remuneration and working conditions were seen as adequate.

**Based on earlier experience, the GDI-led consortium have noted that they feel that it should be possible to deliver effective mentoring with a higher ratio of participants to mentors** (at least 75 participants per mentor, and possibly higher). Rather than a one-size-fits-all structure, the ratio of mentors to participants (and perhaps also mentors to mentor supervisors) should be adjusted so that a mentor who serves a smaller, more densely-populated area can be expected to serve more participants than a mentor in a sparsely-populated sub-county (e.g. in Marsabit) with long travel times. Mentors in Mwatate expressed confidence that if necessary they could serve an additional 50 participants each (i.e. doubling their caseload to a total of 100). This would however depend on continued access to a programme motorbike and an allowance of KSh 3,000 per month for petrol and subsistence costs.

**Greater efficiency – and effectiveness – can also be achieved with attention to the sizes of business groups and VSLAs that mentors must support.** Business 'groups' which consist of just one EIP participant household should be avoided. This aspect of programme efficiency lies outside the specific the mentoring model, but does affect it to a significant degree.

*The money should be released at the right season. For example, for the people who are planning to farm, the money should be released at the start of the planting season. We were to receive a grant of 20,000 and then 10,000. This did not happen. If it were possible for everyone to receive their money at the same time and in the same amount while we are being trained together and mentored together that would be very good.   (Female participant, Taveta FGD)*

## 3.5    Sustainability

### 3.5.1  To what extent does the GoK have the capacity to continue to implement the mentorship approach as it was designed?

**As of mid-2023 the GoK does not yet have the capacity in place to continue to implement the EIP mentorship approach as designed** i.e. it is not in a position to take over management of mentoring from the GDI-led consortium.  There have been some positive developments in terms of GoK systems (e.g. the new EIP module of the CD-MIS) but the Government is not ready to employ mentors or manage them in the way that the mentor supervisors have been doing to date. Acquiring this capacity is possible, but would require ringfencing key staff positions to avoid turnover; commitment of multi-year budgets; and recruiting staff into mentor and mentor supervisor positions (or, possibly, recruiting mentors and incorporating EIP mentor supervisor responsibilities into the job descriptions of deputy Sub-County SDOs).  This will take some time to achieve.

**Recognising this, the preferred approach expressed by DSD in June 2023 is to extend the contracting-out approach from phase 1 to phase 2.**  Both the GDI-led consortium, and Government staff, expressed a preference to extend the contracting arrangements used in phase 1 into phase 2.  This reflected a consensus that in most respects, GoK does not yet have the capacity to implement the programme directly.

> *That is why I said before that it is tricky because the role of the SDO.  He normally stays in the office. He is even overwhelmed. Handing over the whole project to the government, unless they have other people on the ground…  that is why I said that the mentor supervisors and the mentors and other staff should be retained.*

### 3.5.2  To what extent does the GoK have the capacity to scale the mentorship approach as it was designed?

**The Government does not yet have the capacity to take a mentoring approach to an expanded scale**: as described above, it needs to first develop the capacity to take over direct implementation of the EIP on the pilot scale (i.e. covering around 7,500 participants).  Building the capacity needed for at-scale implementation is achievable, but would require (significant) budget commitments and time to put in place.  For the DSD to be able to take EIP mentorship to scale is likely to require at least one further round of piloting in order to build institutional capacities. Moving to scale may also require some modifications to the design of mentoring used in the pilot: for example, providing for mentors to each cover more than 50 participants, at least in the more densely populated parts of the programme area.

# 4 Conclusions and lessons

**The process review workstream aims to provide timely and practical advice to those involved in developing economic inclusion programming in Kenya**, based on emerging evidence from the phase 1 pilot of the EIP.  This section summarises the key messages from the findings on mentoring.   It attempts to distinguish between two levels of objectives and achievements.  Section 5.1.1 summarises the evidence on the achievements of the pilot EIP as a delivery programme.  Section 5.1.2 assess the degree to which the pilot phase has build GoK capacity to implement mentoring for economic inclusion in future phases of programming.  The final section (5.1.3) draws out some key lessons that are relevant beyond the specific context of Kenya and the EIP.

## 4.1 Conclusions

### 4.1.1 EIP design is relevant to participants' needs and internally coherent

**The assumptions in the design of the EIP regarding the delivery of a coherent package of mentoring held during the phase 1 pilot.**  The pilot can be seen to have achieved its immediate objectives of delivering effective mentoring, in terms of relevant and appropriate training, advice and support, and facilitation of collective action for economic empowerment.  As such, mentoring activities have contributed to what is defined as in the EIP Monitoring and Evaluation Framework theory of change as component 1 ("to improve the socioeconomic status of 7,500 extreme poor in 5 pilot counties").

**The implementing consortium succeeded in recruiting staff with the desired numbers and skills to establish a cadre of mentors and mentor supervisors.**  Training and supervision of mentors appear to have worked well, despite the need to adopt distance learning for parts of the training (due to continued effects of COVID-19 restrictions).

**Once established, EIP mentors have succeeded in delivering relevant training, advice and group formation activities to roughly the target number of participants.**  The intended number of VSLAs have been formed; most remain active and have succeeded in encouraging significant saving, providing a sustainable increase in the supply of credit for both consumption and investment; and training provided to participants appears to have been relevant to their needs and capacities and local livelihood opportunities, and delivered in an appropriate manner.

**This reflects the fact that there is a broad (though not universal) consensus on what is required for effective mentoring.**  Based on previous experience in Kenya and the global evidence base, GDI's leadership compared designing a programme of mentoring for economic inclusion as analogous to "a recipe for cake, not curry": that is, successful mentorship requires a combination of relatively well-established 'ingredients' in broadly consistent ratios and sequences, with limited need for significant adaptation and iteration.  In particular, there was a strong consensus from both GDI and development partners that mentors should be "paid, well trained, and from the community".

**These achievements have been reflected in positive feedback from participants**, who were in regular contact with 'their' mentors and spoke positively about how training, advice and improved access to finance through the VSLAs had helped them better manage their businesses.

*You also find that some did not understand about savings, but now some of them have even been able to join chamas and do some savings. There are some, like one that I had who was able to understand that she can be able to use little money, that she is getting from her profits, to be able to repair her stalled house and be able to do plastering and now at least she is able to offer some renting there and get some money as well.*

*(Mentors FGD, Mwatate)*

**The qualitative fieldwork suggested emerging evidence of EIP's impact on at least some participants' living standards.** This clearly reflects to a significant degree the injection of money into participant households through the consumption support cash transfers: but does also reflect the contribution of EIP mentoring activities to participants' confidence and capacity for supporting themselves.

*This programme has uplifted us. We are very thankful for our government for this program. They should bring more projects like this to the community.*

*(FGD, Marsabit)*

*Initially before this programme started, we'd go without breakfast and lunch. But now we can afford breakfast and even an accompaniment for it, we may miss lunch, but we will have supper. At least we eat two meals a day.* *(FGD, Taita Taveta)*

*Interviewer: You say you have been able to see a difference in people's status or lives. What examples can you give of this?*
*Even in the way they used to dress - you find that now there is some money and they have bought some nice dresses. There is a house that has been renovated, if they used to sleep on the floor, you find that now they sleep on a mattress.* *(Mentors FGD, Mwatate)*

**However, this success was qualified in two respects.** The first was that other aspects of phase 1 implementation negatively affected the work of the mentors and constrained the impact that they could achieve. Economic inclusion programmes are premised on a theory of change in which the combination of complementary forms of support provides a 'big push' that can help poor households move permanently out of poverty. By simultaneously building both financial capital (through cash transfers to allow households to smooth consumption, and asset transfers to enable 'lumpy' large initial investments in setting up a livelihood) and human capital (through the training, advice and facilitation of group formation and cooperation that mentors provide), economic inclusion approaches aim to achieve synergies which result in impact which is greater than that which could be achieved by money or training alone.

**Framing this in terms of the theory change, there were a number of fundamental assumptions underpinning the design of the mentoring component** with regard to how it would fit into the overall programme and so contribute to the synergies needed to achieve economic inclusion. It was assumed that targeting and enrolment would be completed on time, and that disbursement of transfers (consumption support and asset transfers) would take place on schedule - following shortly after participants had received training from the mentors - and at largely the same time for all participants.

**In reality, the scheduling of activities as planned in the EIP's design has been disrupted, with effects on other elements of the programme, including mentoring.** A long drawn-out targeting process and delayed and staggered enrolment, followed by delays to payments of consumption support and asset transfers, has reduced the efficiency and effectiveness of mentors' work. As such, the assumptions regarding synergies between mentoring activities and other programme outputs did not hold, and reduced the effectiveness of mentoring.

### 4.1.2 Government capacity to implement the EIP is not yet in place

**The second manner in which the mentoring model of phase 1 has fallen short of objectives is with regard to the longer-term aim of building GoK capacity.** In the design of the EIP, during phase 1 the implementing consortium and the Government were work together to ensure that in later phases of implementation, DSD would be able to take on responsibility for implementing the EIP (including mentoring activities) directly, rather than by contracting out to an implementing partner such as the GDI-led consortium. This objective was captured in the second of the two 'components' specified in the theory of change in the EIP Operational Manual, which aimed to achieve "EIP systems built for implementation and scale up, and the improved capacity of government (DSD) officials to co-implement the programme in the 5 pilot counties and scale up EIP activities beyond the 5 pilot counties".

**The pilot has been much less effective when measured against this objective.** During phase 1, mentoring has been delivered by the GDI-led consortium. There has been some engagement of county and sub-county officials in these processes, particularly in observing training. The level of this participation in mentoring has however varied considerably between locations, and even in the best circumstances has been quite limited.

**It is worth acknowledging that among the many aspects of the EIP programme model, mentoring is one of the more difficult for the Government to take on.** With regard to targeting, the Government of Kenya had relatively well-developed systems already in use for the CCTP: there was a strong case for the GDI-led consortium to work with these existing systems, rather than try to transpose into the EIP the targeting systems they were familiar with from their own programmes. By contrast, the GoK has not implemented mentoring in the past and so does not possess a cadre of frontline staff capable of performing the roles of mentor or mentor supervisor. For mentoring, there was little in the way of existing GoK systems for the EIP to align with. It was clear that if Government was to acquire the capacity to provide mentoring, it would need to work closely with the GDI-led consortium towards developing the necessary workforce.

**At the end of phase 1, the GoK does not have staff or systems in place to implement the mentoring function that is essential to the success of the EIP.** Capacity *has* been built in the central EIP unit within DSD. This does not fully mirror programme management systems within the GDI-led consortium, but is nonetheless substantial[17]. At county and sub-county levels, however, the GoK does not have frontline staff who could deliver the EIP mentoring service that has been performed by mentors and mentor supervisors employed by BOMA and Village Enterprise. Turnover has contributed to the slow progress in building Government ownership of and capacity for the EIP, at both local level (among SCSDOs) and in the central leadership of the programme unit in DSD.

**In mid-2023, as phase 1 approached its end, there appeared to have been little strategic communication between DSD and GDI regarding how the Government would sustain mentoring beyond the end of phase 1.** Two options were debated at the validation workshop in June[18].

---

[17] Capacity within the EIP unit in DSD also includes coordination arrangements that will be necessary for Government implementation and can only be performed by DSD (e.g., communication and coordination with DSA), rather than GDI.

[18] A third option – to make the role of mentor a volunteer rather than paid position – was also raised but is strongly discouraged by most stakeholders. The post of mentor makes considerable demands (in terms of training, travel, and contact time). It is unlikely that there will be enough individuals who are (i) living in the programme area, (ii) have

- The first option (put forward in the pre-workshop draft of this review) proposed that the mentors employed by BOMA and Village Enterprise during phase 1 would be offered positions as Government employees in phase 2. The mentor supervisor role would be performed by deputy SCSDOs. In sub-counties in which this position was vacant, the existing phase 1 mentor supervisor for that county could be offered this position.

- The second, chosen at the end of the workshop, was to extend phase 1 arrangements and continue to contract out EIP delivery to the GDI-led consortium for a second phase. This should ensure continuity of EIP service delivery, but represents an acknowledgement that GoK implementation capacity has not been developed in phase 1 as had been planned.

**In conclusion, in mid-2023 it appears that the Government does not yet have the capacity to implement the EIP.** To develop the necessary capacity over the new phase, during which the GDI consortium will continue to deliver the programme, will require close attention to agreeing and following a plan for capacity development. Commitment of GoK budget and a plan for recruiting and managing a public sector mentor workforce are essential first steps in any such plan.

## 4.2    Lessons

**The process review of EIP mentoring suggest some lessons that are likely to be relevant to a range of stakeholders beyond those involved in the EIP, including governments and development partners in other countries.** Some of these global lessons with regard to what has and has not worked with mentoring, and why, confirm and reinforce lessons that emerged from the first process review report, on EIP targeting.

**The first lesson is that governments are likely to be challenged by the complexity of economic inclusion programming.** Multifaceted, 'big push' approaches which attempt to address multiple constraints facing poor households simultaneously are by their nature considerably more complicated than programmes which attempt to address just one constraint at a time (e.g. through unconditional cash transfers, agricultural or livestock extension, or microfinance). Those attempting to support graduation programmes will need to allow for more time and dedicate closer attention than they might for other replication processes.

**By extension, adapting NGO economic inclusion programmes for government implementation is likely to require significant change to programme design.** As with all processes in which a high-impact innovation is taken from NGO-implemented pilot to large-scale implementation by government, there is a balance to be struck between design fidelity and necessary adaptation. When NGOs are commissioned to adapt their own programmes for government implementation, this is likely to involve uncomfortable but necessary decisions on what aspects need to be adjusted. In the case of complex economic inclusion programmes with multiple components, the degree of adaptation is likely to be more substantial than it might be for other types of programme.

**To deliver a programme which achieves synergies between different elements requires a very high degree of coordination.** In Kenya, this has proved (relatively) easy to achieve for NGOs implementing their own programmes, when all elements of delivery are under the control of a single organisation. It has proved considerably harder when, as in phase 1 of the EIP, different

---

the skills and experience required, and (iii) are able to afford to take a full-time volunteer role, rather than look for paid work.

elements of the programme are delivered by different organisations (the NGOs and different parts of government).

**When attempting to take an innovative, NGO-led programming model (such as poverty graduation programming) and adapt it for large-scale implementation by Government, it is logical to adopt a gradual, phased approach.** This is the approach that has been taken in Kenya for the EIP. During an initial phase, NGOs familiar with the programme model have been responsible for implementation; while the Government was to build up the capacity and systems it needs to take over implementation. It was intended that as capacity is built up, the Government would assume progressively greater responsibility for implementation in the second and subsequent phases.

**Making this approach work is however difficult**. It requires balancing the effort that is dedicated to these two processes (implementation and capacity building), which need to occur at the same time. The implementing partner is likely to have pressing incentives to focus on the immediate objectives of delivering a quality service which achieves results for participants (particularly if this delivery has become more complicated, and results less certain, when working in partnership with Government). They may struggle to understand and adapt to Government capacities and practices; and may not necessarily have the skills for identifying and implementing capacity development needs (as opposed to the skills required to deliver mentoring themselves). On the other side of the equation, a Government with limited capacity may not be able to provide the leadership and direction that is needed to define and request the support they need to strengthen their capacity to implement.

**Managing capacity development requires matching demand (the articulation of need in the form of requests from the Government institution in question) and supply (what can be provided by the non-Governmental actor tasked to support capacity development).** The relative importance of demand and supply in a capacity development process is likely to vary between contexts (countries and programmes) and, within a given programme, between different components of programme implementation. Some elements of economic inclusion programming – for example, targeting – may in principle require relatively minor change to existing government systems. By contrast, there may be little or no existing capacity with a government to provide mentoring for economic inclusion[19]. In such contexts, the government will need to engage actively in formulating a model of mentoring which it can realistically implement (which is likely to be significantly different from that used by NGOs in smaller-scale programmes). It will also need to take the lead in identifying the resources that will be required to put this model in place. This is a fundamentally political process, relating as it does to budget processes and rules on public sector employment.

**For this approach to work, Government commitment and leadership are thus critical.** Even with the best of intentions and proactive efforts to transfer skills and build Government capacity alongside delivering the service, the implementing partner cannot build Government capacity if the Government does not (i) provide the engagement that the programme requires in the first, proof-of-concept phase, or (ii) provide a clear statement of the resources that will be available for later, Government-implemented phases.

---

[19] Some countries may already employ a frontline workforce (for example, of agricultural extension agents or social workers) which is large enough and good enough that it can feasibly be repurposed to perform the mentoring function in an economic inclusion programme. Many countries, however, do not have a workforce with the numbers and /or quality needed for the mentoring role.

# 5    Recommendations

**The following recommendations reflect findings from the qualitative research, review of programme monitoring data and secondary sources, and discussions at the validation workshop in Nairobi.**  These recommendations focus on the actions that are needed in transitioning from the phase 1 pilot to phase 2.  Arrangements for phase 2 will need to balance (i) realism regarding current capacity and what is needed to ensure continued delivery of the programme over the course of 2024 with (ii) a greater level of ambition and sustained attention to building GoK capacity so that there is progress towards greater Government ownership of implementation from 2025 and beyond.

**Firstly, it seems inevitable that stakeholders will need to extend the implementation arrangements adopted for phase 1 into phase 2.**  It now seems unlikely that the Government will be in a position to assume responsibility for direct implementation of the EIP at the end of phase 1 (as had been planned originally).  Specifically with regard to core capacities for mentoring, the Government does not have staff employed at the sub-county level who could assume the role of mentors.  To avoid a break in implementation, the best option for phase 2, due to begin in September or October 2023, is to extend the DSD contract for the GDI-led consortium to continue to implement the programme.  To do this, DSD will need to secure the approval of the Ministry's Contract Implementation Team (CIT) to extend the contract end date from November 2023 until the end of December 2024, to cover the anticipated 15 month implementation period for Phase 2.

**However, plans for phase 2 should build in specific, time-bound commitments to programme adaptation and capacity development.**  If implementation of phase 2 is to continue to be led by the GDI-led consortium, it is important to use this time (somewhat over 12 months) to build GoK capacity to assume greater responsibility by the start of phase 3.  This will require better communication between DSD and the GDI-led consortium to reach agreement on (i) adaptations and simplifications necessary for GoK implementation and (ii) time and resources that GoK will commit to building up capacity.  Without setting and adhering to such milestones, there is a risk that at the end of phase 2 (i.e. the end of December 2024) there will be no significant change in GoK implementation capacity.

**The Government and the GDI consortium need to use phase 2 to agree on a simpler model of EIP mentorship which can realistically be implemented by the Government from 2025 onwards.**  The GDI-led consortium will need to work with DSD to agree on how to strike the balance between fidelity to the essential elements of a successful NGO model of mentoring for economic inclusion, as used in phase 1, which need to be retained; and adjustments to reflect the human and budgetary resources available to the Government to implement the approach at scale.  The gap between current GoK staffing levels at sub-county level and the staffing of the mentorship role in the current, GDI-led implementation of the EIP is very wide.

**Many aspects of simplification and adaptation will need to be worked out; but some are already known.**  DSD has stated that from phase 2, Model A and Model B variants should be replaced by a single 'DSD model' with much greater consistency across the programme (for example, in the timing of VSLA formation and asset transfers and the size of VSLAs).  There is a reasonably strong consensus regarding a number of practical recommendations which should make it possible to retain effectiveness while reducing costs.  These include (i) reducing the duration of participants' contact with mentors; (ii) maintaining the principle that participants should form businesses together, in groups of three, rather than as individuals; and (iii) increasing the ratio of participants to mentors, up from 50 participants per mentor to 75 or 100 – although this will need to be lower in sparsely-populated areas such as Marsabit.

**However, even if aiming a simpler design, DSD is going to struggle to develop capacity for direct implementation of EIP mentoring functions in the foreseeable future.** Building this minimum required level of capacity by the end of 2024 will require strong and consistent senior political leadership from DSD, increased allocations of GoK budget, and regular, frequent and productive collaboration between GDI and DSD at all levels.

**Critically, with the help of the contracted delivery consortium, DSD at county and sub-county levels will need to develop significantly stronger capacity to implement EIP mentoring.** There is a significant difference in capacity between the capacity of the GDI-led consortium and that of the Government structure which it is intended will take on implementation of the EIP. While the Government already possess the capacity to implement other aspects of the EIP, including targeting and the distribution of transfers, it does *not* currently possess the staffing and systems required to provide mentoring as part of an economic inclusion programme. This lack of capacity is the fundamental barrier to the successful transition from a contracted-out model to one delivered at scale by the Government. To build up the required capacity requires a number of different elements.

**Staffing the post of deputy SCSDO (at present, often not filled in many sub-counties), and making this individual responsible only for EIP implementation, appears to be the best option for Government to take on the employment of mentor supervisors in the EIP programme areas.** Both the GDI consortium and DSD were reasonably optimistic that most of the current mentor supervisors would be willing to transition over from NGO to Government contracts in this way. Plans for Phase 2 now envision sustaining coverage at the same level of around 7,500 (newly-enrolled) participants, rather than expanding to cover a larger number. This would require only around 10 mentor supervisors, which would be a relatively modest addition to the Government payroll.

**GoK and GDI will need to find a viable model for staffing the mentor role.** Finding a way for the Government to directly employ mentors will be much harder than achieving Government employment of the mentor supervisors. Phase 1 has employed c. 150 mentors in 10 sub-counties, or around 15 mentors per sub-county. This mentor workforce could be reduced (maybe by half) if it is felt that each mentor could adequately serve more participants than they do now. It will be challenging but probably feasible to define a job description and employment contract for mentors which is compliant with GoK scales and structures. (Ensuring the access to funds or assets for 'facilitation' – covering mentors' necessary expenses for travel, as GDI has done in Phase 1 with provision of motorbikes and funds for petrol – may be harder.) The key challenge is obtaining the budget and permission to take on liability for so many new staff (75 – 100) in the context of fiscal pressures on GoK budgets and a standing freeze on civil service recruitment.

**GoK and its partners should consider the merits (and risks) of a hybrid arrangement**, in which mentor supervisors become DSD employees, supervising and supporting mentors who remain contracted-in staff employed by the NGOs. This arrangement would be less ambitious than was anticipated in the original three-phase plan for economic inclusion programming to become a core part of GOK social policy implementation, in which it was envisioned that in phases 2 and 3 mentors would be employed by the Government. It does however seem more realistic at this point. Having Government staff as mentor supervisors, responsible for managing the mentor workforce directly, would significantly increase the level of GoK engagement in and commitment to the EIP.

**In addition to providing for the frontline (mentor) and middle management (mentor supervisor) roles, GoK with support from GDI will need to define and implement targeted capacity building for central leadership and management functions in DSD.** Given the different stakeholder views on the current status, it is important to first clarify the central capacity that exists at present in DSD and identify what needs to be expanded or added to enable them to

assume responsibility for managing the EIP. DSD should hold structured discussions with GDI to understand the current arrangements for managing the programme and the implications for the personnel and budgets that are needed for DSD to assume responsibility for those central functions which have to date been performed by GDI with support from BOMA and Village Enterprise. A quick, light capacity assessment of DSD would update and clarify the picture on how many staff are likely to be made available to the EIP on an ongoing basis, and what their skills and roles will be; and would help to identify any critical gaps that will need to be addressed.

**Political commitment will be needed to first build and then maintain EIP implementation capacity in Government.** Building up GoK staffing and systems to the point where the Government can successfully implement economic inclusion programming will be difficult and require significant effort. High levels of staff turnover, which is common in Government, will make the effort to build EIP implementation capacity considerably harder. Given that there are limited numbers of staff in DSD who are available to the programme, many of whom can each give only limited amounts of time to implementing the EIP, it would be desirable if these staff remained in position for long enough to become familiar with the programme's objectives and ways of working, and to then apply this knowledge. If the programme frequently loses staff who have been trained and acquired experience, this will retard the development of programme management capacity and undermine programme implementation and impact.

**It is important that this ring-fencing of EIP staff positions extends to all levels.** The effectiveness of mentors is seen to depend heavily on the fact that they are familiar with the local contexts and communities they serve. If a mentor is rotated out of the location in which he or she was recruited, this is likely to reduce the potential impact of the programme. The same logic would apply to the mentor supervisor role, which it is proposed would be performed by the deputy SCSDO. It also applies to the staffing of the central EIP unit in DSD. To date, the technical staff in this unit have been retained without disruption, which has helped in understanding and addressing issues which have arisen during the phase 1 pilot. This practice should be continued. However, while there has been continuity in the staffing of the technical roles in DSD, there has been considerable turnover in the GoK leadership of the EIP, with three individuals holding the role in succession over the course of the phase 1 pilot. This churn has limited the evolution of GoK leadership of the programme, and contributed to the shortfall seen at the end of phase 1 between planned and actual progress in building Government ownership and capacity.

# References

Andrews, C., de Montesquiou, A., Arevalo Sanchez, I., Dutta, P., Paul, B. Samaranayake, S., Heisey, J. Clay, T. and Chaudhary, S. (2021) *The State of economic inclusion report 2021: the potential to scale*, Washington, DC: World Bank

Arif, Shafique, Michele Binci, Jana Bischler, Stephanie Brockerhoff, Adiba Khaled, Marta Marzi, Juliet Odindo, Udayan Rathore and Kritika Singh (2022) *Impact Evaluation of the Economic Inclusion Programme (EIP): Baseline Report – Volume 1.* OPM; GEFA Evaluation of HSNP Phase 3.

Balboni, Clare, Oriana Bandiera, Robin Burgess, Maitreesh Ghatak and Anton Heil (2022) "Why do people stay poor?" *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 137 No. 2, pp. 785-844.

Bedoya, Guadelupe, Aidan Coville, Johannes Haushofer, Mohammad Isaqzadeh and Jeremy Shapiro (2019) "No household left behind: Afghanistan Targeting the Ultra Poor Impact Evaluation" World Bank *Policy Research Working Paper* No. 8877; June 2019.

Blattman, Christopher and Laura Ralston (2015) *Generating employment in poor and fragile countries: evidence from labor market and entrepreneurship programs.* June 2015. Available at: s

BOMA (2019) *'Key Findings of the Endline Evaluation on BOMA's Poverty Graduation Pilot with the Government of Kenya's Programme for Rural Outreach of Financial Innovations and Technologies (PROFIT)'.* BOMA Project.

Brooks, Wyatt, Kevin Donovan and Terence R. Johnson (2020) "Is there a cost-effective means of training microenterprises?" *World Bank Economic Review* 34 (Supplement).

Berelowitz, Dan, Madie Darbonne and Nadir Shams (2020) *Evidence and tools for the effective mentoring of micro, small and medium enterprises.* July 2020. Spring Impact and Argidius

Dercon, S. (2008) "Fate and fear: risk and its consequences in Africa." *Journal of African Economies 17* (suppl. 2) pp. ii97–ii127.

DFID (2019) *Ethical Guidance for Research, Evaluation and Monitoring Activities.* IODPARC; 2019.

Gallardo, Miguel Angel Jiminez, Winfred Kananu, Christy Lazicky, Jeffery McManus and Frida Njogu-Ndongwe (2021) *Village Enterprise development impact bond evaluation findings.* IDinsight; November 2021.

GDI (2021) *'Technical Assistance to Support Implementation of Economic Inclusion Intervention under the Kenya Social and Economic Inclusion Project (KSEIP): Project Inception Report'.*

Gobin, V. J. and Santos, P. (2015) *'All together now: the impact of a multifaceted approach to poverty alleviation'.* BOMA Project.

GoK (2021) *Economic Inclusion Programme (EIP): Monitoring and Evaluation Framework.* Ministry of Public Services, Gender, Senior Citizens and Special Programmes; State Department for Social Protection, Senior Citizens Affairs and Special Programmes; Directorate of Social Development; December 2021.

KNBS (2019) *2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census, Volume 1: population by county and sub-county.* November 2019.

KNBS, MoH and ICF (2023) *Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2022*.

Kunaka, Cordelia and Menisha N. Moos (2019) "Evaluating mentor outcomes from the perspectives of entrepreneurs and small business owners." *The South African Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business Management*; 11 (1), March 2019.

Mullainathan, S., and E. Shafir (2013) *Scarcity: Why having too little means so much.* New York: Times Books / Henry Holt.

OPM (2021a) *Evaluation of the Hunger Safety Net Phase 3: Design Note: Workstream 3 – Process Review (Addendum 5).* Oxford Policy Management.

OPM (2021b) *Evaluation of the Hunger Safety Net Phase 3: Inception Report.* Oxford Policy Management.

OPM (2021) *Evaluation of the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) Phase 3 KSEIP economic inclusion draft theory of change note (Addendum 3).* October 2021.

OPM (2023) *Process review of the Economic Inclusion Programme (EIP): Report 1: Assessment of the EIP targeting process.* Final Report, August 2023.

Sanders, Catherine (2019) *Grantees: the BOMA project and CARE International in Kenya.* PROFIT Financial Graduation Endline Report; June 2019

World Bank (2018) *International Development Association Project Appraisal Document on a proposed credit in the amount of Euro 215.9 million (US$250 million equivalent) to the Republic of Kenya for the Kenya Social and Economic Inclusion Project.* World Bank Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice, Africa Region; Report No: PAD2911; November 2nd 2018 pp. 1-2.

# Annex A: theory of change



Source: OPM (2021) Evaluation of the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) Phase 3 KSEIP economic inclusion draft theory of change note (Addendum 3).   October 2021

# Annex B: EIP theory of change and results frameworks developed by the GDI-led consortium

## 2.1. EIP Theory of Change (TOC)

The EIP programme is based on the following theory of change:

1. **If** EIP programme provides a poverty graduation package to extreme poor participants that include (1) asset transfer of KES 30,000; (2) monthly consumption support of KES 2,000; (3) training and mentorship in business and livelihood; and (4) linkage to markets and other social services, **then** there will be increased income for the participants leading to reduced poverty, increased food security and enhanced social inclusion in household and community level

2. **If** GDI Consortium builds capacity of SDSP team through (1) co-designing of the EIP pilot programme; (2) capacity building of SDSP staff at county and national level on poverty graduation programming; and (3) co-implementing of the EIP pilot programme, **then** there will be enhanced Capacity of SDSP and improved Systems to lead and Scale Economic Inclusion Program in Kenya





Source: Government of Kenya (2021) *Economic Inclusion Programme (EIP) Monitoring and Evaluation Framework*

# Annex C List of county- and sub-county-level interviews

## A.1 County- and sub-county-level KIIs – Marsabit

| Institution | Title | Data of interview |
|---|---|---|
| DSD | County Coordinator Social Development | 11th May 2023 |
| GDI Consortium | County Programme Manager | 9th May 2023 |
| BOMA | Mentor Supervisor (Saku) | 10th May 2023 |
| DSD | SCSDO (North Horr) | 11th May 2023 |
| DSD | SCSDO (Saku) | 11th May 2023 |
| BOMA | Mentors (Saku) | 9th May 2023 |
| - | EIP Participants (FGD) | 11th May 2023 |

## A.2 County- and sub-county-level KIIs – Taita Taveta

| Institution | Title | Data of interview |
|---|---|---|
| GDI Consortium | County Programme Manager | 16th May 2023 |
| DSD | SCSDO (Taveta) | 17th May 2023 |
| Village Enterprise | Mentor supervisor (Taveta) | 17th May 2023 |
| GoK | County Commissioner | 16th May 2023 |
| DSD | County Coordinator Social Development | 16th May 2023 |
| DSD | SCSDO (Mwatate) | 18th May 2023 |
| BOMA | Mentor Supervisor (Mwatate) | 17th May 2023 |
| BOMA | Mentors (Mwatate) | 15th May 2023 |
| Village Enterprise | Mentors (Taveta) | 17th May 2023 |
| - | EIP Participants (FGD) | 17th May 2023 |

# Annex D List of national-level interviews

| Institution | Role | Name | Date of interview |
|---|---|---|---|
| GDI consortium | Operations Manager | Ann Murage | 27th April 2023 |
| GDI consortium | National Technical Assistance Coordinator | George N'dungu | 27th April 2023<br>2nd June 2023 |
| DSD | EIP Safeguarding officer | Teplar Sitati | 5th June 2023 |
| DSD | CDMIS ICT officer | Genson Mwangi | 5th June 2023 |
| DSD | M&E Coordinator | Steven N'dungu | 5th June 2023 |
| Development Pathways | Developer, CD-MIS | Paul Muriuki | 22nd May 2023 |
| GDI consortium | Director of GDI consortium | Alice Gugelev | 2nd June 2023 |
| BOMA | EIP Programme Manager (Model A) | Dorine Genga | 26th May 2023 |
| Village Enterprise | EIP Programme Manager (Model B) | Isaiah Lekesike | 26th May 2023 |
| GDI consortium | M&E Manager | Charles Maina | 27th April 2023 |
| GDI (BOMA & VE) | Mentor Supervisors (From all 5 counties) | - | 3rd May 2023 |
| World Bank | Task Team Leader | Yulia Smolyar | 8th June 2023 |

# Annex E Agenda of the validation and learning workshop

**Day 1 (6<sup>th</sup> June 2023)**

| Timing | Session topic | Session format |
|---|---|---|
| **08:30 – 09:00** | **Arrival of participants** | |
| **09:00 – 09:15** | Opening of workshop (SDSP - DSD) | Opening remarks |
| **09:15 – 09:30** | Introductions | Interactive exercise |
| **09:15 – 09:45** | Overview of EIP Evaluation activities & 2nd process review | Presentation |
| **09:45 – 10:15** | Icebreaker | Interactive exercise |
| **10:15 – 10:45** | **Coffee break and interactive EIP Mentorship Refresher** | |
| **10:45 – 11:30** | Summary of EIP Mentorship Implementation<br>Success & challenges of the mentorship process | Presentation |
| **11:45 – 12:30** | "EIP Implementation Challenges"<br>*Groups discuss and refine the findings, identifying what worked well & what should be revised in phase 2.* | First working session (group exercise + presentations) |
| **12:30 – 13:30** | **Lunch break** | |
| **13:30 – 15:00** | "EIP Mentorship required capacities"<br>*Highlighting the various resources, capacities, & systems required to carry out the main mentorship activities* | Second working session (group exercise + presentations) |
| **15:00 – 15:30** | **Feedback session and End of Day 1** | |

### Day 1 expected outcomes:

At the end of the first day of the workshop all participants will have arrived at a common understanding of how mentorship has been implemented under phase 1, what has and has not worked well, and what has been required to maintain the mentorship activities in Phase 1.

## Day 2 (8th June 2023)

| Timing | Session topic | Session format |
|---|---|---|
| **08:30 – 09:00** | **Arrival of participants** | |
| **09:00 – 09:30** | Feedback and take-aways from day 1 | Interactive exercise |
| **09:30 – 11:00** | Understanding GoK plans for mentorship<br>*Facilitated exercise to map out timeline of activities planned under Phase 2.*<br>*Referring to findings from day one to identify critical design and implementation decisions for delivering mentorship in Phase 2.* | Interactive exercise / presentation |
| **11:00 – 11:15** | **Coffee break** | |
| **11:15 – 12:30** | Development of proposals for planning mentorship in Phase 2.<br>*Thematic groups related to e.g.:*<br>• *Retention and or recruitment of mentors & mentor supervisors*<br>• *Programme management: oversight & support capacity needs*<br>• *Monitoring strategy & MIS*<br>• *Systems (Case Management, extension & referrals)*<br>• *Logistical support* | Group work |
| **12:30 – 13:30** | **Lunch break** | |
| **13:30 – 15:00** | Group presentations and plenary discussions around proposals for making mentorship work in phase 2 | Presentation |
| **15:00 – 15:30** | **Closing remarks and End of Day 2** | |

### Day 2 expected outcomes:

At the end of day 2, workshop participants will have arrived at a consensus about the recommendations and key decisions regarding the planning and management of mentorship under GoK implementation in Phase 2.

There will be an agreed action plan specifying next steps, timelines and who is responsible for the implementation. OPM will summarise the discussion outcomes in a note that will be shared with the workshop participants after the workshop and that will help guide the design of the mentorship process for phase 2 of the EIP.

# Annex F    Summary answers to the evaluation questions

| DAC criteria | # | Research questions | Summary conclusions |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Relevance** | A1 | • Have the assumptions underpinning the design and implementation of the mentorship component held during implementation? | • The assumptions regarding the delivery of a coherent package of mentoring – i.e., providing programme participants with business and life skills, helping them organise into business groups to pool money and effort, and facilitating the formation and running of VSLAs to improve sustainable access to credit in the programme area – held during implementation.<br>• The more fundamental assumption underpinning the design of the mentoring component was that targeting and enrolment would be completed to schedule, and enable disbursement of transfers to coincide with training and guidance provided by mentors. The model also assumed that participants would receive transfers (both asset transfers and consumption support) at predictable and regular intervals. These assumptions did not hold, and reduced the effectiveness of mentoring activities. |
| | A2 | • Does intervention design for the EIP provide sufficient flexibility to respond to changes in the context of implementation, or upon evidence generated by the programme? | • The delivery of mentorship activities adapted in response to delayed and variable enrolment and payments, in particular through modifying the timetable for training participants (and also refresher training for mentors, given the time that had elapsed from their original training). However, given the widespread and lengthy nature of the delays, this flexibility was not enough to make a significant difference to the problems that programme participants faced in making use of the mentoring that was provided. |
| **Coherence** | B1 | • How coherent is the EIP delivery system for mentorship with other GoK systems and programmes?<br>• Were the appropriate stakeholders involved in the implementation of EIP mentorship? | • As an activity which is new to the Government of Kenya, it is hard to identify how the EIP mentoring approach itself can be made coherent with GoK practice in a direct sense. The posts of mentor and mentor supervisor are not fundamentally incompatible with GoK staffing practices (e.g. in terms of salary and other benefits). The size of the mentor workforce that is required, however, is not coherent with existing budgets and accountability arrangements.<br>• The delivery of EIP mentorship along the lines employed for cohort 1 requires a significant frontline workforce of mentors and mentor supervisors. While the skills required of individuals are not out of reach of local government, there would need to be significant recruitment of larger numbers of staff at sub-county level to make GoK systems for the delivery of the EIP resemble those employed to date by the GDI consortium.<br>• At the centre, the small EIP unit in DSD was involved; but at sub-national level the delivery of EIP mentoring for cohort 1 was almost exclusively provided by BOMA and |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Village Enterprise staff.  There had been greater engagement of GoK staff with regard to targeting and enrolment (recorded in the preceding process review); but less engagement in ongoing support to business groups and VSLAs. |
| | B2 | • To what extent are coordination, linkages, roles, and responsibilities working between different levels of government and between government departments as it relates to the implementation of mentorship? | • While there have been some gains in horizontal coordination at the centre between DSD and DSA  with regard to the delivery and oversight of the EIP, vertical integration has been limited.  Communication between centre and sub-national levels occurred in response to case management issues, but was not an ongoing, institutionalised practice; and took considerable time.<br>• DSA needed to be involved in managing changes to the participant lists – for example, in the case of death or household dissolution.  This was recognised but a systematic solution was not developed, which resulted in long delays in updating EIP transfer payrolls, and money going into accounts of participants who had passed away.  Replacement individuals need to be named during enrolment, as is standard in the administration of the NSDP programmes. |

| DAC criteria | # | Research questions | Summary conclusions |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Effectiveness** | C1 | • To what extent has the mentorship component delivered its intended scope and reach? | • The mentorship component has succeeded in delivering relevant training and group formation activities to roughly the target number of participants. The intended number of VSLAs have been formed; most remain active; and training appears to have been relevant to participant needs and capacities and local livelihood opportunities, and delivered in an appropriate manner. |
| | C2 | • What capacities do stakeholders think have to be in place at all levels of government for the EIP to function (at pilot and at scale)?<br>• To what extent are effective training and capacity-building arrangements in place and successfully implemented? | • There is a need for a cadre of mentors and mentor supervisors. At present, it is not clear how this cadre will be provided for Cohort 2. It seems most likely that this will be provided in a form much like that in Cohort 1: i.e., through an extension of the contract with the GDI-led consortium for BOMA and Village Enterprise to provide mentoring activities, with light-touch engagement by DSD during implementation. This would however represent a continuation of the pilot at a scale similar to that of Cohort 1: significant scale-up would require a major increase in capacity.<br>• There is a need for greater consistency of GoK staffing. Turnover is a problem at both central level, in the leadership of the DSD Division responsible for EIP; and at County and Sub-County level, where staff are rotated between locations on a frequent basis.<br>• The GDI consortium has the capacity to train participants (and have mentor supervisors train mentors), developed through experience implementing Cohort 1. There has been little activity in preparation of GoK training or other capacity building for the mentoring workforce (mentors and mentor supervisors) that would be needed to take over implementation from GDI. |
| | C3 | • To what extent have the systems to deliver mentorship been set up?<br>• To what extent do stakeholders think that the GoK developed the capacity to implement these systems independently? | • In mid-2023, mentorship systems are set up, but in effect still exist outside Government, within the GDI-led consortium. Within Government, progress has been made in putting in place elements of the overarching structure that will be needed (e.g. the creation of a EIP module for the CD-MIS): but other critical aspects of mentorship delivery systems within Government (most obviously, a workforce of mentors and mentor supervisors) have largely yet to be established.<br>• There is a broad consensus that GoK has yet to develop the capacity to implement the EIP without considerable involvement from contracted-in providers. |

| DAC criteria | # | Research questions | Summary conclusions |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Efficiency** | D1 | • To what extent has the mentorship component been delivered within the expected time and resource requirements? <br> • How can the delivery of the mentorship component be more efficient? | • Accounting for the delays in targeting and enrolment that set back the start of mentoring activities, mentoring has taken place within the anticipated time and, as far as can be determined, budget. GDI implementing partners have a good understanding of the costs involved in delivering mentorship, given previous experience; the challenge has been the protracted duration of work, given delays to the start. <br> • The primary decisions to be taken with regard to efficiency concern the intensity and duration of participation that is required to provide participants with the capacities needed to improve their livelihoods on a sustainable basis. Based upon previous experience, GDI believes that the duration of programme delivery can be reduced to 15 months. There is also scope for more flexibility in staffing ratios to reflect the diversity of contexts within the programme area. Rather than a one-size-fits-all structure, the ratio of mentors to participants (and perhaps also mentors to mentor supervisors) should be adjusted so that a mentor in a sparsely-populated sub-county (e.g. in Marsabit) with long travel times should be expected to serve fewer participants than a mentor who serves a smaller, more densely-populated area. <br> • Greater efficiency – and effectiveness – can also be achieved with attention to the sizes of business groups and VSLAs that mentors must support. Business 'groups' which consist of just one EIP participant household should be avoided. |
| DAC criteria | # | Research questions | Summary conclusions |
| **Sustainability** | E1 | • To what extent does the GoK have the capacity to continue to implement the mentorship approach as it was designed? | • While recognising helpful improvements such as the new EIP module of the CD-MIS, as of mid-2023 the GoK does not yet have the capacity in place to continue to implement the EIP mentorship approach as designed. Acquiring this capacity is not impossible, but would require ringfencing key staff positions to avoid turnover; commitment of multi-year budgets; and recruiting staff into mentor and mentor supervisor positions (or, possibly, recruiting mentors and incorporating EIP mentor supervisor responsibilities into the job descriptions of deputy Sub-County SDOs). This will take some time to achieve. Recognising this, the preferred approach expressed by DSD in June 2023 is to extend the contracting-out approach from cohort 1 to cohort 2 by extending the contract with the GDI consortium. |
| | E2 | • To what extent does the GoK have the capacity to scale the mentorship approach as it was designed. | • The GoK does not currently have the capacity to scale up mentoring. Building this capacity is achievable, but would require (significant) budget commitments and time to put in place. |